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ABSTRACT: I explore whether the level of ideological diversity among Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) members has declined since the emergence of their conceptual 
framework.  I analyze votes made by FASB members on Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards and compare them to comment letters submitted by constituent sponsoring organizations.  
I demonstrate that, relative to the Pre-CF regime (1973–1986), FASB members’ voting positions 
in the CF regime (1987–2007) are (i) less like their constituent sponsors and (ii) more like one 
another.  The former result is primarily attributable to differences between FASB members with 
auditor and preparer backgrounds and those groups’ sponsors.  Both of these shifts are associated 
with standards increasing accounting relevance; in the CF regime, standards that increase relevance 
likely do so because of the framework’s broad focus on decision usefulness.  I document a 
significant increase in sponsors’ dissent in the CF regime, and regression analysis indicates that 
variation in standards’ authoritative references to the conceptual framework accounts for all of this 
increase.  Lastly, from 1996–2007, all but one dissenting vote by FASB members on fair value 
standards explicitly argues for an even greater use of fair values, while none argue for less use.  To 
the extent FASB members’ individual ideologies influence their voting positions, the evidence is 
consistent with a decline in the level of ideological diversity among FASB members in the CF 
regime. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, I investigate a potential long-term consequence of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board’s (“FASB” or “the Board”) conceptual framework (“CF” or “the framework”).  
The framework was central to the FASB’s creation, as one of the items on their initial agenda 
was a project to establish broad standard setting guidelines (FASB 1973) that evolved into the 
CF.  Intended to provide the Board with a cohesive system of objectives and fundamentals to use 
in setting standards, the framework was to guide the FASB in part by prohibiting alternatives that 
violate it, thereby narrowing the range of alternatives for the Board to consider (FASB 1976).  
Baxter (1962) posits that one consequence of authority declaring that any one view of accounting 
is better than the others is that, in the long run, it can “narrow the scope for individual thought 
and judgment.”  Kothari et al. (2010, 36) call for research to address “what institutional features 
of standard setting might help reduce the effect of ideology on standard setting?”  In this spirit, I 
explore whether the conceptual framework has served to embed the effect of ideology in 
standard setting by causing a decline in the level of ideological diversity among standard-setters. 
An ideology is a collection of normative beliefs and values held by an individual or group 
(Honderich 2005).  Clearly, members of deliberative bodies such as the FASB are not motivated 
solely by their personal ideological beliefs; they face complex and competing motivations while 
making consequential decisions.  Nevertheless, the dominant political science view is that U.S. 
Supreme Court justices’ votes primarily reflect their personal “ideological attitudes and values” 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Similarly, FASB members’ ideologies likely influence their voting 
positions (assent or dissent) on Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFASs” or 
“standards”).  To the extent this is the case, ceteris paribus, a decline in dissent implies fewer 
opposing viewpoints and, therefore, a decline in ideological diversity. 
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Ex post, it may seem obvious to some that narrowing the set of acceptable accounting 
will ultimately narrow the ideologies of standard-setters.  Ex ante, however, the FASB held dual 
goals of developing a conceptual framework (AICPA 1973) and promoting a diversity of views 
and backgrounds (AICPA 1972).  As such, it seems unlikely there was an intent for the CF to 
reduce ideological diversity.  Indeed, Miller et al. (1994, 20-21) note that the FASB was formed 
in part because its predecessors “did not appear to provide an equal opportunity for all interested 
groups to participate in (and to affect the outcome of) the standards-setting process.” 
To determine when the FASB began implementing the framework, I review each 
standard and identify every authoritative reference to the CF.  I find a sharp increase in such 
references shortly after the issuance of SFAS 91 and distinguish the CF regime (SFAS 92–160, 
1987–2007) from the Pre-CF regime (SFAS 1–91, 1973–1986) in order to evaluate possible 
effects of the framework.  I then note that the FASB has linked decision usefulness, which they 
state is the broad focus of the CF, to their emphasis on the relevance of information to investors 
and creditors (Johnson 2005).  Therefore, in order to link standards to the framework, I utilize 
Allen and Ramanna (2013) metrics to identify standards that increase accounting relevance. 
A key goal driving the FASB’s initial institutional structure was to increase the diversity 
of views and backgrounds involved in the standard setting process (AICPA 1972, 57-60).  This 
structure operated as follows: constituents were divided into groups – auditors, financial 
statement preparers, financial statement users (e.g. investors, financial analysts), accounting 
academics, and government regulators; each constituent group was represented by sponsoring 
organizations (e.g., auditors were represented by the AICPA); the sponsors elected Trustees of 
the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF); and the FAF Trustees elected FASB members.  I 
compare FASB members’ votes on standards to positions taken by sponsors in comment letters 
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to Exposure Drafts relating to those standards.  Utilizing sponsors’ positions not only provides a 
meaningful point of comparison for FASB positions, it also provides a control for endogenous 
standard-specific characteristics that might affect the rate of dissent – for example, if standards 
proposed under one regime are inherently more controversial than under the other regime. 
In total, I compare 762 FASB votes on 159 standards to the position of each member’s 
sponsoring organization(s).  Using a difference-in-differences design, I demonstrate that, relative 
to the Pre-CF regime, in the CF regime FASB members vote (i) less like their sponsor(s) and (ii) 
more like one another.  (In supplemental analysis, I discover that the former result is primarily 
attributable to differences between FASB members with auditor and preparer backgrounds and 
those groups’ sponsors.)  I then create a variable to measure the diversity of FASB members’ 
positions relative to their sponsors on each standard.  I use multivariate analyses to confirm the 
finding that there was a decline in the diversity of FASB members’ voting positions in the CF 
regime, both independently (i.e., within the Board itself) and relative to their sponsors. 
If this decline is a consequence of the framework, diversity should be lower on those 
standards associated with it.  I extend the multivariate analyses and document that the observed 
decline in the diversity of FASB positions (both independently and relative to their sponsors) is 
associated with standards that increase accounting relevance.  In the CF regime, standards that 
increase relevance likely do so because the FASB reinforced the framework’s focus on decision 
usefulness.  I then use the sponsors’ comment letter positions to develop a measure of 
‘constituent dissent,’ and note an increase in sponsor dissent in the CF regime.  Regression 
analysis indicates that the observed increase in standards’ authoritative references to the 
framework accounts for all of the increase in sponsor dissent.  These results confirm a link 
between the decline in diversity of FASB voting positions and standards associated with the CF. 
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In my primary analysis, I do not differentiate the reasons behind each dissent, so it is 
possible that I mischaracterize some dissenting members’ positions.  I read and code dissenting 
explanations on fair value standards, which I identify via an Allen and Ramanna (2013) metric.  
This allows me to identify whether, among other reasons, the dissenting member opposes 
because they disagree with the use of fair values (what I term “outside dissent”) – or whether 
they oppose because the standard does not implement enough fair value accounting (“inside 
dissent”).  In periods with low ideological diversity, we would expect to see relatively limited 
‘outside’ dissent.  Across twenty-two fair value standards from SFAS 125 to SFAS 160, 
encompassing 149 votes in total, I find zero ‘outside’ dissents and only one dissent that does not 
explicitly call for an even greater use of fair values.  Across these standards, I identify 117 
sponsors’ positions and document 42.5 dissents.  This demonstrates very little diversity among 
FASB members’ positions on the issue of fair value accounting in the CF regime. 
I perform a series of robustness tests.  I first perform alternate tests in which I compare 
each FASB vote to the average position of all constituent groups’ sponsors.  This demonstrates 
that my primary results are not driven by temporal changes in constituent group representation 
on the Board (e.g., fewer auditor members in the CF regime).  I then show that there is no 
significant temporal change in the FASB’s length of deliberation in response to unpopular 
Exposure Drafts.  As such, it is unlikely that they responded to unpopular standards with more 
substantive changes in the CF regime than in the Pre-CF regime.  Lastly, I show that the results 
are robust to (i) removing the standards deemed least significant by the FASB’s constituents, (ii) 
using earlier ‘break’ points to divide the sample, and (iii) removing any individual observation. 
I document a significant decline in the diversity of voting positions among FASB 
members during the CF regime, and demonstrate links between this decline and standards 
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associated with the conceptual framework.  While I cannot specify a precise causal mechanism 
for this effect, to the extent FASB members’ individual ideologies influence their voting 
positions, the overall evidence is consistent with the conceptual framework causing a significant 
long-term decline in the level of ideological diversity among standard-setters. 
Recent surveys have highlighted ideology theory – that standards are jointly determined 
by standard-setters’ ideologies and interest-group lobbying – as a useful model of standard 
setting (Kothari et al. 2010; Gipper et al. 2013; Ramanna 2015).  I contribute to this literature by 
highlighting the role of ideological diversity, as ideology may be less influential when standard-
setters’ ideologies are relatively diverse, and lobbying efforts from diverse interest groups may 
be less influential when standard-setters’ ideologies are more narrowly dispersed.  If so, then 
perhaps one consequence of the FASB implementing its framework is that interest-group 
lobbying carried relatively less influence during the CF regime than during the Pre-CF regime. 
I am not aware of any prior studies on the ideological diversity of standard-setters, or that 
empirically examine the long-term consequences of the FASB’s conceptual framework.  Allen 
and Ramanna (2013) evaluate how FASB members’ personal characteristics influence the nature 
of standards.  Numerous studies empirically test the link between lobbying on proposed 
accounting standards and changes subsequently made to those standards, both in the U.S. (Puro 
1984; Brown and Feroz 1992; Buckmaster et al. 1994; Ramanna 2008) and abroad (McLeay et 
al. 2000; Hansen 2011).  Other studies evaluate voting for evidence of coalition formation 
(Newman 1981a, 1981b; Selto and Grove 1983; Moody and Flesher 1986) and find that voting 
power is not concentrated within repeated coalitions. 
Prior research does provide an alternate perspective on certain changes during the CF 
regime.  Healy and Wahlen (1999) link the rise in fair values to the S&L crisis in the late 1980’s.  
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The governmental response to this crisis (Zeff 2003, 272-273) may have led to the addition of 
FASB members with financial services backgrounds (Allen and Ramanna 2013).  Ramanna 
(2013) attributes the rise of fair values to the inclusion of these members, while Jiang et al. 
(2017) note that financial instruments were the most frequent topic for standards during this 
period.  This process might have empowered the financial services industry, and, indeed, I find 
financial statement user sponsors most favored the FASB’s direction (Young 2006).  While this 
composite account may help explain certain changes – like the increased use of fair values – it 
does not explain the observed decline in the diversity of FASB members’ voting positions.  
Perhaps, in addition to these changes, some external threat caused members to vote with greater 
unanimity to demonstrate strength in order to protect the institution (Rohde 1972; Newman 
1981a).  However, the observed increase in inside dissent runs counter to this explanation. 
On the other hand, perhaps FASB members in the CF regime vote less like their sponsors 
and more like one another due to any number of changes unrelated to the framework that 
differentially affected the standard setting environment in each regime.  For example, perhaps 
changes to the Board’s due process caused members to be less sensitive to the views of their 
constituents in the CF regime.  However, alternative explanations of this type cannot reconcile 
why the observed patterns are more pronounced on standards associated with the framework. 
To summarize, the evidence I present in this study is consistent with the conceptual 
framework causing a long-term decline in the level of ideological diversity among standard-
setters.  Moreover, while I cannot rule out alternative explanations for each individual finding, it 
is difficult for any single alternate explanation to reconcile all of the evidence.  As such, I hope 
to amplify the Kothari et al. (2010) call for research to more clearly specify the factors that 
appear to have institutionalized ideology in U.S. standard setting. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Background: Ideological Beliefs 
An ideology is a collection of normative beliefs and values held by an individual or group 
(Honderich 2005).  Differing ideological beliefs about accounting concepts and methods – for 
example, support for either the income statement or balance sheet approach (Gipper et al. 2013) 
– can drive competing preferences on accounting standards. 
At present, we know very little about what motivates standard-setters (Kothari et al. 
2010).  In addition to their ideology – and beyond the facts of the standard up for debate – 
standard-setters’ decisions are likely a function of many competing motivations, including 
concerns about their reputation, career, and influence, the preferences and influence of their 
constituents and other standard-setters, and the broader institutional context. 
Similarly, U.S. Supreme Court justices face complex motivations.  Nevertheless, the 
‘attitudinal’ approach (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002) – that justices’ votes 
largely reflect their personal ideological attitudes and values – has emerged as the dominant 
political science view.  Indeed, while the ‘strategic’ approach (which focuses on the effect of 
strategic behavior and institutional context) is often framed as a competing alternative (e.g., 
Martin and Quinn 2002), its authors acknowledge that ideology is the primary factor determining 
justices’ decisions (Epstein and Knight 1998).  Therefore, political science informs us that a 
standard-setters’ personal ideology likely has a significant influence on their voting decisions.  
As such, I use FASB members’ voting positions as a proxy for their ideological beliefs. 
2.2 Background: Institutional Structure 
The FAF and FASB were created following a period of “unprecedented stress” on the 
accounting profession that created an urgent need for improving accounting standards (AICPA 
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1972, 3-4).  In this environment, one of the FASB’s founding objectives was to increase the 
diversity of views and backgrounds involved in the standard setting process.  This was 
accomplished in part by providing statutory authority to ‘sponsoring organizations’ representing 
five constituent groups (Zeff 1978; Gore 1992, 141-151), as illustrated in Figure 1.1 
Historically, members of these organizations (via a separate group of “Electors”) met to 
collectively elect new FAF Trustees from a pool of individuals nominated by the organizations.2  
The FAF Board of Trustees then selected FASB members.  As such, during the period covered in 
this study, the constituent sponsors held indirect authority to select FASB members. 
This authority was statutory, included in the FAF’s by-laws and subject to change as 
groups exchanged influence through time.  For example, the 1987 FAF by-laws dictated that the 
sixteen Trustees were to include four auditors, three preparers, two users, one academic, three 
government regulators, and three at-large Trustees.3  Similarly, the Board’s composition has 
historically reflected informal quotas, subject to change over time; in 1987, the seven members 
included three auditors, two preparers, one academic, and one government regulator. 
2.3 Background: Conceptual Framework 
2.3.1 Demand for an accounting framework 
One of the founding objectives of the FASB’s predecessor (the Accounting Principles 
Board, or APB) was to determine basic postulates and broad principles of accounting, and they 
were widely perceived to have failed at the task (Moonitz 1974; Zeff 1999).  In 1970, the APB 
                                                          
1 I additionally confirm information in section 2.1 through review of the FAF’s historical by-laws, which I obtained 
from the FAF by request in 2013.  They provided twelve such documents from the Public Record. 
 
2 This describes the process until 2002, when the process changed for every group (except for the Government), 
such that the existing FAF Board of Trustees elected new Trustees from candidates provided by the sponsors.  This 
changed again in 2008 to fully remove all formal authority of the non-Government sponsors to elect FAF Trustees 
FAF (2008).  The latter change did not take effect until after all standards covered in this study were issued. 
 
3 Little research has been done over the FAF’s actions, perhaps because some of their activities – including meetings 
to determine the selection of FASB members – are conducted in private (Miller et al. 1994). 
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issued Statement No. 4 (“Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises”); however, it was seen as a disappointment, and did little to 
reduce the demand for a deductive framework (Gore 1992). 
The APB was the target of both dissatisfaction from constituents and oversight pressure 
from the SEC and Congress.  The APB struggled to provide detailed guidance on divisive topics 
– as some members were content to describe generally accepted practices – and were criticized 
for the diversity of observed practice for similar transactions and circumstances.  Due to 
ideological differences on fundamental issues, it was difficult to generate consensus on 
controversial topics.4  As such, much of the APB’s guidance reflected compromises between 
opposing points of view (Dopuch and Sunder 1980), so standards lacked “coherence and logic” 
(AAA 1971) and were not always broadly accepted (Horngren 1973).  Also, the APB approached 
each issue on a standalone basis (Gellein 1986), sometimes leading to internally inconsistent 
standards (Chatov 1975).  The framework provided a means to address many of these issues. 
2.3.2 The ‘conceptual framework regime’ 
The framework is a collective of Concepts Statements (CONs) issued over a number of 
years, though the prevailing belief (Solomons 1986; Agrawal 1987; Gerboth 1987) was that the 
issuance of CON 6 in December 1985 completed the CF.  To determine when the FASB began 
implementing the framework, I document every authoritative reference in standards to the CF, as 
follows.  I download PDFs of all original pronouncements from the FASB website, search the 
text of each standard (i.e., the numbered paragraphs and footnotes) for “concept,” review each 
item, and document three types of explicit references.  First, authoritative references to APB 
Statement No. 4 (once the initial search for “concept” identifies one reference to APB No. 4, I 
                                                          
4 See Zeff (1971, 134-236) as a reference for the preceding portion of the paragraph. 
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search “No. 4” to identify additional references).  Second, references that the Board was limited 
in some way, or the scope of the standard was affected, because the CF was not yet complete.5  
Third, authoritative references to the CF (either to individual CONs or to the “conceptual 
framework”); this excludes both (i) mentions that constituent respondents referenced the CF and 
(ii) basic descriptive (i.e., non-authoritative) references to the CF.  I consolidate multiple 
citations within a single numbered paragraph into one ‘reference.’ 
The data, illustrated in Figure 2, indicate a sharp increase in the volume of CF references 
starting with SFAS 93, issued in October 1987.  Since SFAS 92 was also issued in October 1987 
and was the first standard issued under a new Chairperson, I use it as a ‘break point’ and define 
SFAS 1–91 as the Pre-CF regime, with SFAS 92 the start of the CF regime.6  After splitting the 
data in Figure 2 by regime, only one value in the CF regime (associated with SFAS 104) is lower 
than the maximum value in the Pre-CF regime (SFAS 79).  The data, therefore, indicate a 
discrete break in implementation of the conceptual framework around this time. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
One element of the FASB’s founding mission was to develop conceptually consistent 
standards, while another was to diversify the voices and backgrounds involved in the standard 
setting process.  Is it possible that these goals are in conflict – that one consequence of 
institutionalizing accounting standard setting is that it can lead to a narrowing of thought? 
Referring to the CF as a ‘constitution,’ the FASB (1976, 6) noted “it will narrow the 
range of alternatives to be considered by the Board because some alternatives will clearly be 
                                                          
5 For example, from SFAS 48: “…the Board may wish to evaluate the standards in this Statement when its 
conceptual framework project is completed” (FASB 1981, para 17). 
 
6 The institutional structure central to this study, described in Section 2.2, ended in 2008; see Note 2.  Further, in 
2008 the first Exposure Draft for an update to the FASB’s CF via the FASB-IASB convergence project was issued 
(FASB 2008).  The convergence project resulted in two updates in 2010 before the project ended in 2014. 
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‘unconstitutional.’”  Baxter (1962) argues that following such a direction is, ultimately, likely to 
narrow the scope for individual thought and judgment.  On freedom of thought (pp. 420-421): 
‘Freedom’…means the absence…of benevolent authority that makes us respectful to some ideas 
and hostile to others.  Man should be able to think freely and without bias, so that the stream of 
new ideas can flow strongly; and he should be able to discuss and experiment freely and without 
bias, so that all ideas can be criticised and tested with rigour.  If authority intervenes…by giving 
its imprimatur to some favourite idea…the chances of progress are lessened.  Men cease to think 
so freely…and therefore the stream of new ideas dries up.  They cease to discuss and experiment 
so freely…criticism loses its edge, and ideas are not put to a stern test.  (emphasis original) 
 
Baxter’s argument provides the motivation for this study, but it provides neither a 
mechanism nor a testable theory.  Rather, I explore one potential consequence of his prediction: 
whether the CF has helped reduce the level of ideological diversity among standard-setters.7  
This requires addressing two distinct questions.  The first question is, has ideological diversity 
declined during the CF regime?  As this study is exploratory, all hypotheses are in the null form. 
Hypothesis 1a: There is no change from the Pre-CF regime to the CF regime in 
the diversity of FASB members’ voting positions. 
 
As the sponsoring organizations were selected in part to reflect a diversity of views and 
backgrounds, they represent an ideal point of comparison against which to measure the effect of 
the framework.  As such, I compare FASB positions to positions taken by their sponsors. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is no change across regimes in the diversity of FASB 
members’ voting positions relative to the diversity of their sponsors’ positions. 
 
The second question to be addressed is, if ideological diversity declined during 
the CF regime, is the CF associated with the decline?  While H1a and H1b indirectly 
address this question, I address this question more directly with Hypotheses 2a and 2b.8 
                                                          
7 Baxter (1962) does not reference the idea of a conceptual framework.  However, in a follow-up article Baxter 
stated of the FASB’s then in-progress CF that “such a super-standard of ultimate principles would be a fearsome 
extension” towards the future direction he was arguing against (Baxter 1981, 6).  Others have presented similar 
arguments that detailed standards can discourage professional debate and experimentation (Sunder 2010). 
 
8 H1a and H1b provide some evidence towards this because the Pre-CF/CF distinction is not just an arbitrary, 
circumstantial ‘break’ in time – the data underlying Figure 2 provide evidence of a systematic difference in 
standards across regimes that directly relates to the framework itself. 
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Hypothesis 2a (2b): Variation across regimes in the diversity of FASB members’ 
voting positions (relative to the diversity of their sponsors’ positions) is unrelated 
to standards that are associated with the framework. 
 
It is possible for individuals who oppose a standard to hold diametrically opposed 
positions on its underlying concepts.  That is, one might fundamentally disagree with the ideas a 
standard implements (‘outside’ opposition), while another might oppose because the standard 
does not go far enough to implement the ideas (‘inside’ opposition).9  If ideological diversity 
declined during the CF regime, and this was associated with the CF, one consequence would be 
an increase in the rate of ‘inside’ opposition on standards associated with the framework. 
Hypothesis 3: On standards associated with the framework, there is no change 
across regimes in the rate of ‘inside’ opposition as a percentage of all opposition. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1 Empirical Approach 
3.1.1 Identifying the positions of FASB members and their sponsoring organizations 
As described earlier, I use the voting positions of FASB member i as a proxy for their 
ideological beliefs.  On a given standard, these positions are assent (POSi = 1) or dissent (POSi = 
0).  This implies that, ceteris paribus, a Board voting 7-0 in favor of a standard is less 
ideologically diverse than one voting 5-2.  However, standard-specific characteristics are also 
likely to affect the rate of dissent; some standards address highly controversial topics, while 
some others simply defer the effective date of prior standards.  To address this, I compare FASB 
votes to the positions of the FASB’s sponsors, thereby controlling for endogenous shifts in the 
types of standards proposed in each regime that might affect the rate of dissent.  I identify the 
position taken by the sponsor(s) for each member’s constituent group as follows. 
                                                          
9 The initial U.S. standard setting body, the AICPA’s Committee on Accounting Procedure, began publishing 
dissenting arguments in 1939 in order to distinguish between these two types of opposition (Zeff 1971, 138). 
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I first identify every comment letter (CL) submitted by every sponsor to the final 
Exposure Draft (ED) relating to SFAS 1 through SFAS 160.10,11  (This represents 163 total 
standards, since the set is inclusive of revisions: SFAS 132R, 123R, and 141R).  I classify the CL 
position of sponsor m into five categories, as illustrated in Figure 3: strongly oppose (POSm = 0), 
lean oppose (0.25), neither support nor oppose (0.5), lean support (0.75), and strongly support 
(POSm = 1).
12  When a sponsor submits more than one comment letter, I combine all letters into 
one document from which I identify POSm.  Finally, I measure the position of constituent group j 
(POSj) on standard t as the average position taken by that group’s sponsor(s) m. 
Both myself and a research assistant (RA) independently coded each CL based upon a 
random order of standards.  The RA is a former accounting PhD student who was not informed 
about the topic or objectives of this study.  I retained all data where our initial codes aligned.  For 
letters where our codes differed, the RA and I exchanged notes about the rationale behind our 
decisions.  Then, the RA considered the evidence and determined the final category for all 
letters.  The weighted kappa (inter-coder reliability) between the initial two sets of codes was 
                                                          
10 Typically, each sponsor has a committee specifically designed to interact with the FASB that prepares these 
comment letters.  In fact, the signatories of the sponsors’ CLs include ten individuals who later became Board 
members, including at least one member from each of the four major constituencies.  Starting from the first 
signatory selected onto the Board, this represented ten of the next twenty-eight FASB members, indicating that the 
signatories of sponsors’ CLs are likely one of the best sources of prospective FASB members. 
 
11 An Exposure Draft is “essentially a pro forma final document” that must be published for all projects that lead to 
an standard (Miller et al. 1994, 73).  The FASB is supposed to incorporate only minor changes from an ED into the 
final standard; otherwise, they are to issue another ED for public review.  As such, for each standard, I use comment 
letters submitted on the final ED.  I address potential confounds arising from this issue in section 4.4.3. 
 
The FASB’s due process procedures have undergone numerous changes in order to balance standard setting 
timeliness with sufficient constituent outreach (Van Riper 1987).  If the net effect has increased (decreased) 
constituent outreach prior to the ED stage, they may lead FASB positions to converge with (diverge from) sponsors’ 
positions in the CF regime, relative to the Pre-CF regime.  Therefore, due process changes that are unrelated to the 
CF are potential confounds, as they may drive spurious results for H1a/H1b.  I address this matter in section 5.1.1. 
 
12 In a U.K. study, Georgiou (2004) finds that firms’ use of unobservable lobbying in the standard setting process is 
significantly associated with their use of comment letters. Further, a U.S. study finds a strong complementary 
association between various forms of lobbying by interest groups (Ansolabehere et al. 2002). Therefore, positions 
stated within comment letters are likely to be associated with sponsors’ preferred positions. 
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0.64.  Further, 95% of the initial codes (502 out of 528) either named the identical category or 
were within one adjacent category.  A supplementary internet appendix includes the instructions 
provided to the RA, as well as examples of comment letter language within each category. 
I am unable to “match” a FASB vote to the position of their associated sponsor(s) if they 
do not submit a CL on the related ED.  When this occurs, I drop the observation from the 
“matched sample.”13  I drop the Government constituency because their sponsors (GFOA and 
NASACT) submitted CLs on EDs for only two standards.  I match votes from 159 out of 163 
standards, and match a total of 762 constituent positions out of a pool of 1,011 FASB votes. 
I further illustrate this process by using SFAS 87 (“Employers’ Accounting for 
Pensions”) as an example.  Seven FASB members voted on SFAS 87 – three auditors, one 
preparer, one user, one academic, and one government regulator.  Comment letters to the final 
ED were received from the AICPA, FEI, IMA, CFA Institute, and AAA.  These letters were 
coded as described above.  Finally, six FASB votes are matched to sponsors’ positions: the three 
auditors to the AICPA position, the preparer to the average of the FEI and IMA positions, the 
user to the CFA Institute position, and the academic to the AAA position.14 
Appendix 1 provides detail on all key variables in this study.  Appendix 2 provides data 
on all positions extracted from sponsors’ comment letters (i.e., all POSm). 
                                                          
13 I expect sponsors will submit CLs when the benefit of doing so exceeds the cost.  Therefore, the set of comment 
letters I observe for each sponsor likely represents those standards that have meaningful priority to that organization, 
while the standards on which no letter is submitted are likely immaterial.  
 
While the sponsors represent an ideal comparison group, this process does not represent a clean control match – as 
in a controlled laboratory experiment – and I do not imply this by using the term ‘matched sample.’ 
 
14 I aggregate votes for each standard (rather than analyzing each individual vote) to identify the positions of the 
Board as a whole, because the FAF collectively elects FASB members (i.e., sponsors do not select their own 
‘representative’; see section 2.1).  Further, I match each member’s vote to their sponsor(s) position (rather than to 
the average sponsor position) because I expect the Board’s composition to be a function of each constituent group’s 
relative influence at that time.  That is, I do so in order to control for changes over time in the relative influence of 
each constituent group.  In supplementary analysis, I re-perform hypothesis tests using an alternate measure in 
which I match each FASB vote to the average constituent group position; see section 4.4.2. 
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3.1.2 Measuring the diversity of positions taken by the FASB 
I measure the diversity of FASB members’ positions on a standard by the rate of 
dissenting votes.  I develop a variable, Representativeness (Rt), to measure the diversity of FASB 
positions relative to sponsors’ positions.  Rt measures the extent to which FASB members’ 
positions on standard t (the sum of POSi on matched votes) aligns with the position of sponsors 
(the sum of POSj), and is structured such that ‘perfect’ representativeness leads to a value of 1.0 
(see equation 1).15  If there is a decline across regimes in the diversity of FASB positions, a 
decline in Rt demonstrates a decline in the diversity of FASB positions relative to their sponsors. 
  ∑ POSj,t  – ∑ POSi,t 
Rt   =  1  –  (1) 
       
 
POSj,t (POSi,t) represents the position of constituent group j (FASB member i) on 
standard t, while ni,t represents the total number of matched FASB member votes on t.  I drop all 
standards with fewer than two matched votes.  With this restriction, Rt is available for 153 out of 
a possible 163 standards.  See Appendix 3, where I provide all Rt values. 
3.1.3 Identifying standards associated with the CF 
As described in section 2.2.2, I have collected data on the number of times each standard 
cites the framework for authoritative guidance.  Because this data is skewed, I calculate the 
variable CF_Refs as the log of [1 + (the # of authoritative references to the CF)].  See Appendix 
3, where I provide all CF_Refs values.  While this variable provides a very clear association 
between each standard and the CF, FASB members jointly determine (i) whether and how often 
                                                          
15 I use SFAS 87 as an example to explain the intuition behind the metric.  There were six matched FASB votes on 
SFAS 87 (ni,t = 6), three assents and three dissents (∑ POSi,t = 3).  The matched constituent positions were 0.5, 0.5, 
0.5, 0.125, 0.75, and 0.75 (∑ POSj,t = 3.125).  Therefore, the numerator is equal to 0.125, the quotient is equal to 
0.02, and Rt is equal to 0.98, indicating strong alignment between the FASB and its sponsors. 
 
I utilize a difference-of-sums construction (rather than a sum-of-differences) to identify the positions of the Board as 
a whole because the FAF collectively elects FASB members (see Note 14). 
ni,t 
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to cite the CF and (ii) how they vote.  Because of this endogeneity, I cannot use regression 
techniques to measure the marginal effect of CF_Refs on the diversity of FASB positions. 
Therefore, I seek an additional method to associate standards to the framework.  The 
FASB has stated that decision usefulness (i.e., user primacy) is the broad focus of its framework 
(Johnson 2004) and that this represented a “fundamental change in attitude” toward the purpose 
of financial statements (Storey and Storey 1998, 71).  While incorporating this new approach, the 
FASB has particularly emphasized the relevance of information to investors and creditors 
(Johnson 2005), and during the CF regime it has issued many standards perceived to increase 
relevance (Allen and Ramanna 2013).  Interestingly, standard-setters had long recognized the 
importance of accounting relevance; APB Statement No. 4 declared relevance to be the primary 
qualitative objective of financial accounting, and its description is nearly identical to the 
framework’s description of relevance as a fundamental recognition criteria.16 
While relevance was an established accounting concept, in the Pre-CF regime FASB 
standards did not frequently cite conceptual authority (either APB 4 or CONs; see Figure 2).  
Therefore, standards that increase accounting relevance in the CF regime provide a relatively 
clean association with the framework.  That is, relative to standards increasing relevance in the 
Pre-CF regime, standards that increase relevance in the CF regime likely bear that characteristic 
because the FASB reinforced the framework’s focus on decision usefulness. 
Allen and Ramanna (2013) provide two metrics, inc_relv and Manual_inc_relv, which 
measure the extent to which the Exposure Draft relating to each standard increases relevance.  
The inc_relv metric derives from a textual analysis of comment letters provided by Big 8/6/5/4 
                                                          
16 APB No. 4: Relevant information “bears on the economic decisions for which it is used” (APB 1970, para 88).  
CON 5: Relevant information “is capable of making a difference in user decisions” (FASB 1984, para 63). 
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auditors.17  The Manual metric is derived from a manual assessment from two independent 
reviewers, who develop a count variable with six values identifying various categories of fair 
value usage (in which a value of zero indicates no use of fair values).  I develop an indicator 
variable, Inc_Relv, which equals one if either of the Allen and Ramanna (2013) relevance 
measures is greater than zero.  This variable, therefore, identifies standards that either 
contemporaneous assessors (Big 8/6/5/4 audit firms) or modern assessors (independent 
reviewers) perceive as increasing accounting relevance. 
3.2 Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
I test hypotheses 1a and 2a by estimating variations of equation 2 in a cross-sectional 
regression, with each observation reflecting a standard, and I use a Tobit regression because the 
dependent variable is left-censored at zero.18 
FASB Dissentt  = α + λ1 * Pre-CFt + λ2 * Inc_Relvt + λ3 * Inc_Relvt*Pre-CFt + (2) 
  λ4 * AvgTenuret + λ5 * Supermajorityt + ε 
 
FASB Dissent is the dissent percentage on each standard (total dissents ÷ total votes).  
Pre-CF is an indicator variable equal to one when the standard is issued in the Pre-CF regime.  
Inc_Relv identifies standards increasing accounting relevance.  AvgTenure is the log of the 
average number of standards the members have voted on as of (and inclusive of) standard t.  It is 
included as a control variable because Allen and Ramanna (2013) identified member tenure as a 
determinant of standard setting outcomes.  Supermajority is an indicator variable equal to one 
                                                          
17 This is done via the following process.  First, all uses of the word stem “relevan” are extracted from each letter.  
Second, an RA assesses whether each reference is used in a positive context, or if the usage is irrelevant.  Finally, 
the measures are determined based on the position within the letter of the first positive reference, such that the value 
of inc_relv is higher the earlier the first reference appears. 
 
18 Results for all specifications using Tobit regressions (i.e., equation 2 in Table 3 and equation 4 in Table 5) are 
qualitatively unchanged when estimated using OLS. 
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when a standard is issued under a required supermajority vote.19  As simple majorities are not 
possible under such regimes, I expect this variable to be negatively related to dissent percentage. 
Because the level of analysis is a standard, the output is produced by a combination of 
FASB members.  As such, I partition the population of standards into those created by unique 
combinations of FASB members, and cluster standard errors by combination.20  I test H1a by 
estimating equation 2 without the Inc_Relv variables.  A significant λ1 coefficient (on the Pre-CF 
variable) indicates a significant difference in dissent rates across regimes. 
I test H2a by estimating equation 2 in full.  By construction, the reference category for 
equation 2 is the CF regime, so coefficient λ2 represents the impact of standards increasing 
relevance on FASB Dissent in the CF regime while the sum of coefficients (λ2 + λ3) represents 
the impact in the Pre-CF regime.  If there is a change in FASB Dissent across regimes, a 
significant Inc_Relv coefficient in one regime (both regimes) demonstrates an association (strong 
association) between standards increasing relevance and the change in dissent. 
3.3 Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
I test hypotheses 1b and 2b by estimating variations of equation 3 in a cross-sectional 
OLS regression, with each observation reflecting a standard. 
Rt  = α + γ1 * Pre-CFt + γ2 * Inc_Relvt + γ3 * Inc_Relvt*Pre-CFt + (3) 
  γ4 * AvgTenuret + γ5 * LagReturnt + γ6 * ED_Frequencyt + ε 
 
                                                          
19 At various points the FASB has either had a seven-person Board with a requirement for a 5-2 supermajority, a 
seven-person Board with a simple majority requirement, or a five-person Board with a simple majority requirement. 
 
20 To achieve an appropriate balance of combinations and total standards, I require a combination to have at least 
five associated standards.  Therefore, combinations were identified by starting at SFAS 1 and changing 
combinations at every change in membership after the fifth standard attributed to each combination.  This provides 
for seventeen combinations of FASB members across the 163 standards. 
 
I exclude combination fixed effects, as they capture explanatory power related to systematic differences between 
each combination of FASB members, which is one of the elements the CF split is designed to capture.  A number of 
additional variables identified by prior literature as determinants of standard setting outcomes (e.g. political 
affiliation, professional background, etc.) are time-invariant personal characteristics and therefore also relate to 
differences between combinations of FASB members.  As such, they are also excluded from my model. 
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Rt measures the diversity of FASB positions relative to sponsors’ positions.  Pre-CF is an 
indicator variable equal to one when the standard is issued in the Pre-CF regime.  Inc_Relv 
identifies standards increasing accounting relevance.  AvgTenure is the log of the average 
number of standards the members have voted on as of (and inclusive of) standard t.  LagReturn is 
the lagged one-year return on the CRSP value-weighted index as of the date of the final ED to 
each standard.  Because public demand for regulatory activity tends to peak following market 
failures (e.g., Becker 1983), regulators may have more inherent authority to produce industry-
unfriendly outputs in relatively poor economic periods than during strong periods.  If this is the 
case, LagReturn should be positively related to Rt.  ED_Frequency is the log of the number of 
EDs (that ultimately became standards) that were issued in the two prior years.  To the extent 
constituent concerns of ‘standards overload’ (e.g., Hepp and McRae 1982) influence their 
position on an ED, the ED_Frequency coefficient will be negative.  I cluster standard errors by 
combination.  I test H1b by estimating equation 3 without the Inc_Relv variables.  A significant 
γ1 coefficient (on the Pre-CF variable) indicates a significant difference in Rt across regimes. 
The format of H1b lends itself to further analysis within a difference-in-differences (D-
in-D) design.  This design is desirable because it controls for permanent differences between the 
FASB and its sponsors as well as for inter-temporal changes that affect both groups.  In order to 
execute this design, I first develop a measure of sponsor dissent similar to FASB dissent: I code 
positions less than (equal to) 0.5 as a dissent (one-half of a dissent).  I then execute a D-in-D of 
total FASB and sponsor dissents relating to all matched votes in the Pre-CF and the CF regimes.  
The significance of the overall D-in-D provides a supplementary test of H1b. 
I test H2b by estimating equation 3 in full.  By construction, the reference category for 
equation 3 is CF, so coefficient γ2 represents the impact of standards increasing relevance on 
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Representativeness in the CF regime while the sum of coefficients (γ2 + γ3) represents the impact 
in the Pre-CF regime.  If there is a change in Representativeness across regimes, a significant 
Inc_Relv coefficient in one regime (both regimes) demonstrates an association (strong 
association) between standards increasing relevance and the change in Representativeness. 
3.4 Hypothesis 2b: CF_Refs and Constituent Dissent 
While I cannot use CF_Refs in equations (2) and (3) due to endogeneity concerns, I can 
use this variable to shed light on hypothesis 2b, as follows. 
ConstDissent%t  = α + τ1 * Pre-CFt + τ2 * Inc_Relvt + τ3 * Inc_Relvt*Pre-CFt + (4) 
   τ4 * CF_Refst + τ5 * CF_Refst*Pre-CFt + ε 
 
ConstDissent% is the percent of sponsors’ dissents on each standard; I use a Tobit 
regression because it is left-censored at zero.  Pre-CF is an indicator variable equal to one when 
the standard is issued in the Pre-CF regime.  Inc_Relv identifies standards increasing accounting 
relevance.  CF_Refs identifies the frequency of authoritative references to the CF.  This test can 
demonstrate how standards associated with the CF differentially affect the diversity of sponsors’ 
positions in both the Pre-CF and CF regimes, providing partial evidence towards H2b. 
By construction, the reference category for equation 4 is CF, so coefficient τ2 [τ4] 
represents the impact of standards increasing relevance [how often standards cite the CF] on 
ConstDissent% in the CF regime while the sum of coefficients (τ2 + τ3) [τ4 + τ5] represents the 
impact in the Pre-CF regime.  Because this test provides only partial evidence towards H2b, I 
will consider the results from this test in conjunction with results generated from other tests. 
3.5 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 compares the rate of ‘inside’ opposition on standards associated with the 
framework in the Pre-CF and CF regimes.  I test this by identifying whether there is a change in 
the rate of ‘inside dissent’ on fair value standards; see Figure 4.  I focus on fair values because 
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standards in recent years have called for an increased use of fair values, and because the FASB 
has linked fair value accounting to the CF (Johnson 2005). 
At the end of each standard, dissenting FASB members provide an explanation for their 
vote.  I hand-collect each of these dissenting explanations on fair value standards.  With the 
support of a research assistant, I follow a coding process in which each explanation is first 
divided into distinct arguments, and then each argument is categorized.21  Two such categories 
are “Prefer lesser use of current costs or fair values” and “Prefer greater use of current costs or 
fair values.”  I test H3 by comparing the percentage of greater-use-of-fair-value dissents on fair 
value standards in the Pre-CF and CF regimes. 
As I focus on the diversity of positions taken by FASB members, when estimating 
equations (2) and (3) I include adjusted variables in which I convert ‘inside’ dissents to assents. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Detail on the definitions, construction, and availability of all variables is included within 
Appendix 1.  Figure 5 presents temporal patterns of FASB dissent, constituent (i.e., sponsor) 
dissent, and standard type for the matched sample of FASB votes.  It provides initial evidence of 
changes in the CF regime: an increase in standards increasing accounting relevance coinciding 
with a decrease in FASB dissent and an increase in sponsor dissent. 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics for key variables – Panel A 
for the full sample, while Panel B (Panel C) separates the Pre-CF and CF regimes (Inc_Relv and 
                                                          
21 The coding process operated as follows.  I read every dissenting argument (based upon a random order of 
standards) and coded/categorized each one.  A research assistant (RA) who was not provided with the initial coding 
decisions then independently coded each argument.  Where there was a disagreement between our coding decisions, 
the RA re-reviewed the argument and determined the final argument type.  The RA is an accounting PhD student 
and licensed CPA who was not informed about the topic or objectives of this study. 
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non-Inc_Relv standards).  Panel B provides initial evidence that FASB dissent and 
Representativeness decrease across regimes, and indicates that the preparer sponsors prefer Pre-
CF standards to CF ones, while the user sponsors have opposite preferences.  Per Panel C, 
auditor and preparer sponsors oppose Inc_Relv standards (relative to non-Inc_Relv standards), 
whereas users and academics do not.  Panel D provides the correlation matrix, and documents a 
strong positive relationship between the positions taken by auditors and preparers and by users 
and academics, but no significant relation between positions of any other constituent pairing. 
Panel A of Table 2 provides data for the matched sample of votes.  Consistent with the 
overall population, the matched sample shows a decrease in FASB dissent and increase in 
sponsor dissent in the CF regime.  I will discuss the overall D-in-D along with results for H1b. 
Panel B of Table 2 provides CL submission frequencies to help identify systematic 
patterns to “missing” CLs that might confound H1b and H2b.  For auditors and academics, there 
is no association between changes in submission and changes in dissent.  For preparers and 
users, lower submission rates are associated with greater dissent.  If the latter groups’ unobserved 
positions are more likely to be dissents, this may infer greater user (preparer) dissent in the Pre-
CF (CF) regime.  As such, the effect of these dissents would largely offset in the D-in-D. 
4.2 Results of Hypothesis Tests 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
Table 3 provides results from multivariate tests of hypotheses 1a and 1b.  Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) use FASB Dissent, while columns (4), (5) and (6) use an adjusted FASB Dissent 
variable that converts ‘inside’ dissenting votes on fair value standards to assents.  Columns (1) 
and (4) include only the Pre-CF indicator variable, while columns (2) and (5) include control 
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variables.  Pre-CF is positive and significant in all four columns, indicating a reduction in the 
diversity of individual FASB member positions; as such, I reject H1a. 
Results from testing hypothesis 2a are in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.  The data 
indicate a significantly positive association between Inc_Relv standards and FASB dissent in the 
Pre-CF regime, and a significantly negative association in the CF regime when adjusting for 
inside dissenting votes.  As such, there is a strong association between standards that increase 
accounting relevance and the decline in FASB dissent across regimes, and I reject H2a.22 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
Table 4 provides results from multivariate tests of hypotheses 1b and 2b.  Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) use Rt, while columns (4), (5), and (6) are run using an adjusted Rt variable that 
converts ‘inside’ dissents on fair value standards to assents.  Columns (1) and (4) include only 
Pre-CF, while columns (2) and (5) include control variables.  Pre-CF is positive and significant 
in all four columns.  The D-in-D result (Table 2, Panel A) further supports the finding that FASB 
positions during the CF regime are less diverse than the positions of its sponsors.  I reject H1b. 
Results from testing hypothesis 2b are in columns (3) and (6) of Table 4.  The data 
indicate a significantly negative association between Inc_Relv and Rt in the CF regime, both 
before and after adjusting for inside dissenting votes.  As such, there is an association between 
the decline in the diversity of FASB positions (relative to its sponsors) and standards that 
increase relevance, and I reject H2b.23 
                                                          
22 As described in section 3.1, a significant coefficient in both regimes demonstrates a strong association.  Because 
dissent decreased, this represents a positive (negative) coefficient for the Pre-CF (CF) regime.  The Pre-CF 
coefficient is positive and significant in both specifications.  The CF coefficient is significant when adjusting for 
inside dissents on fair value standards – which, by construction, are in the set of Inc_Relv standards.  As such, the 
modified variable more precisely measures the positions taken by FASB members on these standards.  This 
demonstrates a strong association: Inc_Relv standards are associated with a greater diversity of FASB positions 
during the Pre-CF regime as well as with a lower diversity during the CF regime. 
 
23 As described in section 3.2, a significant coefficient in one regime demonstrates an association.  Because Rt 
decreased, this represents a positive (negative) coefficient for the Pre-CF (CF) regime.  As the CF coefficient is 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 2b: CF_Refs and constituent dissent 
Table 5 provides results for equation (4).  Column (1) confirms that constituent (i.e., 
sponsor) dissent was lower in the Pre-CF regime, while column (2) indicates that Inc_Relv 
standards did not significantly increase constituent dissent during the CF regime (p-value=0.12).  
Column (3) indicates that the frequency of references to the CF in a standard is strongly 
associated with greater constituent dissent to that standard.  Column (4) confirms that all 
significant results from columns (2) and (3) remain significant when all variables are included. 
Two results are particularly notable.  First, the Pseudo R2 increases from 1.7% in column 
(1) to 11.4% in column (3).  Second, the coefficient on the Pre-CF variable is significantly 
negative in column (1), but is positive (though insignificant) in column (3).  This indicates that 
variation in CF_Refs accounts for all of the increase in sponsor dissent in the CF regime. 
The Pearson [Spearman] correlation between FASB Dissent and CF_Refs is significantly 
positive in the Pre-CF regime (p-value=0.01 [0.02]; untabulated) but insignificantly negative in 
the CF regime (p-value=0.82 [0.85]; untabulated).  As such, during the CF regime, FASB dissent 
was unassociated with how frequently standards cited the framework.  However, Table 5 
demonstrates that references to the CF are highly associated with sponsor dissent.  This result is 
difficult to interpret because the direction of causality is uncertain – that is, whether sponsors 
dissent to EDs that cite the CF, or whether the FASB cites the CF more frequently in response to 
sponsor dissent.  In total, however, the evidence supports some sort of relationship between the 
CF and the decline in the diversity of FASB positions relative to their sponsors. 
 
                                                          
negative and significant, this demonstrates an association: Inc_Relv standards are associated with lower FASB 
representativeness during the CF regime.  While the Pre-CF coefficient is also negative, the impact in magnitude is 
much larger during the CF regime, where there were many more Inc_Relv standards – an increase of more than 
500% over the Pre-CF regime (per Table 1, Panel B). 
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4.2.4 Hypothesis 3 
Results for testing hypothesis 3 are in Panel A of Table 6.  All standards on which I 
identify inside dissent in the CF regime are included in Panel B.  There are seven (thirty-two) 
fair value standards in the Pre-CF (CF) regime, on which the dissent rate is 32.7% (8.3%).  On 
fair value standards in the Pre-CF regime, two (three) of the sixteen dissenters argue for lesser 
(greater) use of fair values.  In the CF regime, three (eleven) of the eighteen total dissenters 
argue for lesser (greater) use of fair values.  Notwithstanding the small populations, the increase 
is statistically significant (two-tailed p-value=0.01), and I reject H3. 
On the twenty-two most recent fair value standards in my sample, encompassing 149 
votes, there is only one FASB dissent that does not explicitly call for an even greater use of fair 
values.  Over those same standards, I identify 42.5 constituent dissents on 117 matched votes.24  
This data demonstrates a significant decline in the diversity of FASB positions in the CF regime 
on the issue of fair value accounting. 
4.3 Differences Between Constituent Groups 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal an alignment between positions taken by academic 
and user sponsoring organizations, with the user sponsors (primarily the CFA Institute) 
demonstrating particularly strong support for the FASB in the CF regime.  I identify thirteen of 
the most unpopular standards in the CF regime, and within this subsample the median POSj 
value for each constituent group is 0.25 (auditor and preparer) and 0.75 (user and academic).25  I 
                                                          
24 Some of the opposition embedded in constituent positions may also come from the ‘inside.’  Relative to the other 
constituent groups, financial statement users demonstrated the greatest support for the direction taken by the FASB 
in the CF regime (Table 1, Panel B), and I note a total of four user dissents across the entire CF regime (Table 2, 
Panel B).  As such, it is unlikely that many of these constituent dissents reflect requests for greater use of fair values. 
 
25 I identified the standards using the following criteria: standards in the CF regime with either (i) four or more 
constituent dissents or (ii) with at least three matched votes and a constituent dissent percentage greater than 67%.  
The thirteen standards are SFASs 94, 101, 113, 125, 130, 131, 142, 143, 146, 147, 150, 132R, and 141R. 
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document user positions for twelve of these standards, and on only three standards do any other 
constituency have a higher POSj value. 
Descriptive statistics also reveal an overall alignment between auditor and preparer 
sponsors, as well as their opposition to standards increasing relevance.  Further, per Panel B of 
Table 2, most of the increase in constituent dissent in the CF regime is driven by preparer 
sponsors, followed by auditor sponsors.  In total, this indicates that results in H1b and H2b are 
primarily driven by differences between FASB members with auditor and preparer backgrounds 
and the sponsoring organizations representing those constituent groups. 
4.4 Robustness Procedures 
4.4.1 Robustness procedures: Sensitivity to different CF ‘break’ points 
Reviewing the data underlying Figure 2, the earliest plausible alternate ‘break’ point is 
after SFAS 67, which was the last to reference that the CF was incomplete, and which 
immediately preceded a small increase in references to the framework (see Figure 2 and CF_Refs 
in Appendix 3).  To demonstrate that my results are robust to alternate break points, I re-perform 
hypothesis tests for H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b using SFAS 67, 75 and 83 to delineate regimes.26 
The result for H1a is not significant for any of the earlier break points, as the decrease in 
FASB dissent in the reconfigured CF regimes – without adjusting for inside dissenting votes – is 
no longer significant.  However, results for all other hypotheses remain significant, for all earlier 
break points (though H1b is marginal for SFAS 67).  In summary, the findings of a decline in the 
CF regime in the diversity of FASB members’ positions relative to their sponsors’ positions, 
which is more pronounced on standards associated with the framework, continues to hold with 
CF regime break points as early as SFAS 67 – when the FASB declared the CF incomplete. 
                                                          
26 In general, I re-perform tests of H1a and H2a [H1b and H2b] by re-estimating columns (2) and (6) of Table 3 
[Table 4], respectively.  Here, I also re-perform the D-in-D for H1b and re-estimate column (4) of Table 5 for H2b. 
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4.4.2 Robustness procedures: Alternate ‘matching’ process 
Because the weighting of each constituent group varies with changes in Board 
composition, results for H1b and H2b may be driven by temporal changes in FASB composition 
rather than by sponsors’ preferences.  To address this, I perform alternate tests in which I ‘match’ 
each FASB vote to the average position of all constituent groups submitting a related CL (i.e., 
the average POSj for standard t).  This increases the number of usable FASB votes and more 
closely aligns the vote sample with my current tests of H1a and H2a. 
I first re-perform the D-in-D, and note that the results remain significant under this 
alternate matching process (D-in-D = –12.6%; t-stat = –4.60; untabulated).  I then use this 
process to develop a modified version of Rt.  I note that the observed decline in Rt in the CF 
regime is greater using the modified variable, in both economic magnitude and statistical 
significance (diff = –0.129; t-stat = –4.60; untabulated).  Further, I re-perform tests for H1b and 
H2b with this modified variable, and there are no instances in which a previously significant 
coefficient of interest is statistically insignificant. 
4.4.3 Robustness procedures: Changes to Exposure Drafts 
It is possible that significant changes are made from the ED on which I measure 
sponsors’ positions to the standard on which I observe FASB voting.  Such instances bias my 
results to the extent their frequency differs across regimes – for example, if the FASB responded 
to constituent dissatisfaction in the CF regime by making more substantive changes to EDs 
without issuing a new ED.  To address this possibility, I estimate equation 5 with a cross-
sectional regression using OLS with standard errors clustered by Combination. 
TimeLagt = α + ζ1 * Pre-CFt + ζ2 * ConstDissent%t +  (5) 
   ζ3 * ConstDissent%t*Pre-CFt + ε 
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TimeLag is the log of the number of months between issuance of the (final) ED and the 
standard, which I use to proxy for the degree of change made to the ED after its release.  Pre-CF 
is an indicator variable equal to one when the standard is issued in the Pre-CF regime.  
ConstDissent% is the percent of constituent dissents on each standard.  I interpret a negative ζ3 
coefficient as evidence of a shift in which the FASB made more changes to EDs in response to 
constituent dissatisfaction in the CF regime.  The estimated ζ3 coefficient is insignificant (ζ3= –
0.25, two-tailed p-value=0.58; untabulated), which is inconsistent with such a shift taking place. 
4.4.4 Robustness procedures: Miscellaneous 
Some standards are more important to the FASB’s constituents than others.  To 
demonstrate that my results are not driven by relatively unimportant standards, I re-perform 
hypothesis tests for H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b after excluding standards in the bottom quartile of 
the total number of CLs submitted to the final ED.  For all hypotheses, there are no instances in 
which the coefficient(s) of interest is statistically insignificant after the removal of relatively 
unimportant standards. 
It is also possible that my results are influenced by coding errors.  Systematic coding 
errors are unlikely to influence my findings, as they are likely to offset or “cancel out” in my 
analyses.  I test the sensitivity of my results to idiosyncratic coding error by performing jackknife 
procedures for tests of H1b and H2b, in which the regressions are estimated by successively 
eliminating one observation.  For both hypotheses, there are no instances in which the coefficient 
of interest is statistically insignificant after the elimination of an observation.27 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 To facilitate the removal of individual observations, the jackknife estimations of the regressions in columns (2) 
and (6) of Table 4 are performed with robust but non-clustered standard errors. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
5.1 Discussion 
5.1.1 Inferential limitations 
In much of my analysis, I use an indicator variable to measure differences across regimes, 
in effect treating the CF as an exogenous parameter when it is clearly endogenous to my setting.  
As such, the results from H1a and H1b are subject to the inferential limitation that I cannot 
distinguish the extent to which the results arise due to the framework itself or due to the forces 
and conditions that created the framework.  It is also possible that the results from H1a and H1b 
are spurious, driven by any number of unrelated factors with differential impact across regimes.  
For example: changes to the broader institutional structure, such as the composition of FAF 
Trustees (Miller 2002) or brought about by government oversight (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 
changes to the FASB’s due process (see Note 11); or changes in FASB members’ idiosyncratic 
motivations (e.g., career concerns).  However, explanations of this type cannot reconcile the 
cross-sectional results in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, which support some sort of link to the CF. 
Lastly, my results are subject to inferential limitations regarding the broader effects of 
conceptual frameworks on standard setting, as, in this matter, my study contributes only a single 
case.  Further research is necessary to build our knowledge in this area. 
5.1.2 Pattern in the CF regime appears to be increasing over time 
As Baxter (1962)’s prediction is meant to explain long-term conditions, it is interesting to 
note that the trends in the CF regime in Figure 5 appear to be increasing through time.  I regress 
Representativeness on a Pre-CF time trend variable, a CF time trend variable, and the Pre-CF 
indicator variable – with similar specifications as equation 3 – and discover that the decline in Rt 
in the CF regime is increasing in magnitude over time (p-value=0.02; untabulated). 
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This trend is consistent with a specific form of institutional change.  Once the FASB 
decides to move in a certain direction, for example to focus on decision usefulness, this decision 
can be reinforced absent interference from outside sources, because the cost of effort required to 
change paths acts as a barrier (Hathaway 2001), leading institutional self-reinforcement to drive 
“path dependence” (North 1990; Page 2006).28  Further research is necessary to identify whether 
institutional factors were a key driver for changes in the CF regime, or perhaps whether those 
with institutional power employed the framework as a tool to justify preferred standards. 
5.2 Supplementary Analysis 
5.2.1 Selection or socialization? 
As described in Note 10, the signatories of sponsors’ CLs include ten future members of 
the FASB.  These data can shed some light on whether FASB members in the CF regime favored 
certain standards prior to their joining the Board (the “selection” hypothesis).  I estimate 
equation 6 in an ordered logit regression, with standard errors clustered by sponsor. 
POSm_Ordinal  = α + δ1 * FASB_Pre-CF + δ2 * FASB_CF + (6) 
   δ3 * POSothers_Ordinal + µ1 * Org_Fixed_Effectsm + 
   µ2 * Org_Fixed_Effectsm*Inc_Relv + ε 
 
POSm_Ordinal represents the position of sponsor m on each CL, and is transformed from 
the original POSm taking values {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0} to take integer values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.  
FASB_Pre-CF (FASB_CF) is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the CL signatories 
subsequently became a FASB member in the Pre-CF (CF) regime.  POSothers_Ordinal is the 
average of the ordinal CL positions taken by the other sponsors on the related standard.  Inc_Relv 
identifies standards that increase accounting relevance.  The interaction terms (with coefficients 
                                                          
28 Miller et al. (1994, 25) note that one intended benefit of the CF was to eliminate “redundancy in discussions when 
the same basic issues are debated over and over again,” indicating the FASB faced incentives to reinforce initial 
interpretations of the framework. 
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µ2) control for cross-sectional variation in sponsor preferences on Inc_Relv standards, 
incremental to the overall sponsor preferences captured by the fixed effects (µ1). 
Results are included in Table 7.  Column (1) shows that, for all standards, members 
selected in the CF regime take significantly more favorable positions than Pre-CF members.  
Column (2) shows that members selected in the CF regime demonstrate an ex ante preference for 
Inc_Relv standards.  While this result has marginal statistical significance (two-tailed p-
value=0.07), it is economically meaningful: ceteris paribus, the odds of a CL on an Inc_Relv 
standard being favorable are 292% higher when signed by a CF regime FASB member.  Column 
(3) shows that members selected in the CF regime take more favorable positions on standards 
referencing the CF, although the margin is statistically insignificant (two-tailed p-value=0.16). 
Another possibility is that standard-setters’ ideologies change during their tenure.  For 
example, a socialization process may lead FASB members in the CF regime to converge to the 
group norm over time (the “socialization” hypothesis).  I estimate equations 2 and 3 separately 
for each regime, and interpret negative coefficients on the AvgTenure variable in the CF regime 
as consistent with a socialization effect (i.e., more exposure to the FASB leads to reduced Board 
dissent and Representativeness), and positive coefficients as consistent with a “cold feet” effect 
(i.e., new FASB members are more likely to conform).29  For both equations, the AvgTenure 
coefficient is insignificant in the Pre-CF regime, but is positive and statistically significant in the 
CF regime (p-values=0.00 and 0.03; untabulated), consistent with the “cold feet” hypothesis. 
In sum, this preliminary evidence supports the ‘cold feet’ over the socialization 
hypothesis, and provides weak support of the selection hypothesis.  However, further research is 
necessary to distinguish between, and build upon, the selection and socialization hypotheses. 
                                                          
29 I estimate separate Pre-CF and CF regressions, rather than estimating the entire sample as before, because the 
AvgTenure*Pre-CF interaction term introduces collinearity problems. 
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5.2.2 Are key standards promulgated more timely in the CF regime? 
It is possible the CF has helped the FASB promulgate key standards on a timelier basis in 
the CF regime.  To bring initial evidence towards this, I collect the date that each standard was 
initially added to the FASB’s agenda, and I construct a variable, OverallLag, equal to the log of 
the number of months between the agenda date and the issuance of the standard.  Detail into the 
collection of FASB agenda data is included in a supplemental internet appendix. 
I regress OverallLag on the log of the number of comment letters relating to each 
standard (which I use to measure the relative importance of each standard), and I measure the 
Pre-CF/CF split as in prior equations.  Indeed, the coefficient of interest in the CF regime is 
44% smaller than for the Pre-CF regime.  Across all standards, the average OverallLag is 819 
days (that is, 2.2 years-to-complete); for a standard in the 75th percentile of CLs received, the 
effect is 75 fewer days-to-complete (2.5 months) in the CF regime. 
While the difference appears economically significant, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant (two-tailed p-value=0.21; untabulated).  Further research is necessary to help 
determine whether key standards are promulgated on a more timely basis in the CF regime.30 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In some respects, this study raises more questions than it provides answers.  If the 
conceptual framework has driven a significant long-term decline in ideological diversity within 
the FASB, then scholars might be interested in researching the causes and consequences of this 
shift.  In Section 5, I bring preliminary evidence towards some of the many possible directions 
for further research.  I present two additional directions here. 
                                                          
30 Such research should also consider any effects of the FASB’s formal attempts to increase its efficiency and 
responsiveness (e.g., McKenna 2003). 
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 It would be useful to have an ex ante measure of FASB members’ ideologies.  This would 
allow for: (i) tests to specify how influential ideology is on members’ votes; (ii) tests to confirm 
whether the Board’s ideological diversity declined in the CF regime; (iii) tests to identify how 
members’ ideologies, including the interplay of members with varying ideologies, affect 
standard setting outcomes; and (iv) tests of the “selection” hypothesis (Section 5.2.1). 
 Janis (1982, 244) documents that low ideological diversity can be a precursor to adverse 
group decision-making processes.31  Given the significance of this hypothetical consequence, 
more research into the antecedent conditions and groupthink symptoms would be useful. 
The FASB arose from a high-stress period with dual goals of (i) promoting a diversity of 
views and backgrounds (AICPA 1972) and (ii) developing conceptually consistent standards 
(AICPA 1973).  Both goals addressed perceived weaknesses of the FASB’s predecessors, in 
order to establish a stable standard setting body and reduce external pressure on the profession.  I 
propose that these goals may naturally be in conflict, such that a stable equilibrium arises only 
when one goal dominates the other.  If so, then perhaps the profession might consider whether 
the institutionalization of standard setting has led to a narrowing of thought among standard-
setters – and possibly even, as Baxter (1962) cautioned, within the profession at large. 
                                                          
31 These include an incomplete survey of alternatives; a failure to examine the risks of the preferred choice; a failure 
to reappraise initially rejected alternatives; and a selective bias in processing information. 
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APPENDIX 1.  Variable detail: Definitions, construction, and availability 
 
Variable Name 
(Short Name) 
Variable 
Type Definition, Construction, and Availability 
Constituent position 
(POSj,t) 
Discrete I measure the position of constituent group j on standard t as the average position taken by the group’s sponsoring 
organizations in comment letters to the final Exposure Draft related to the standard.  I identify CLs submitted by sponsors 
to the final ED relating to each standard, and match FASB votes on each standard to the position taken by that member’s 
sponsor(s).  Positions taken by sponsors in CLs are classified into five categories: strongly oppose (POSm = 0), lean 
oppose (0.25), neither support nor oppose (0.5), lean support (0.75), and strongly support (POSm = 1).  The sponsors are 
identified in Figure 1.  I drop the Government constituency because their organizations (GFOA and NASACT) 
submitted CLs on only two standards.  These data are hand-coded for SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions: 
SFAS 123R, 132R, and 141R).  I identify a total of 423 constituent positions across those 163 standards.  Refer to the 
supplementary internet appendix for a description of the coding process. 
FASB member position 
(POSi,t) 
Binary I measure the position of FASB member i on standard t by their vote: assent (POSi,t = 1) or dissent (POSi,t = 0).  Voting 
data are hand-collected SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions: SFAS 123R, 132R, and 141R). 
Number of matched 
FASB votes (ni,t) 
Count The variable ni,t measures the total number of matched FASB votes i on standard t.  I am unable to ‘match’ a FASB vote 
if the related sponsor(s) does not submit a comment letter on a standard.  I match a total of 762 votes out of a possible 
1,011 FASB votes (this total excludes votes by FASB members from the Government constituency). 
Representativeness 
(Rt) 
Continuous This variable measures the diversity of FASB positions on standard t relative to sponsors’ positions; see equation 1.  
The metric is structured such that ‘perfect’ representativeness leads to a score of 1.0.  For each standard I require a 
minimum of two FASB votes matched to sponsors’ positions.  I identify 152 Rt values out of the 163 standards from 
SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions).  Refer to Appendix 3, where I provide all Rt values. 
Constituent dissent 
(Constituent Dissent) 
Discrete This variable transforms the constituent position variable (POSj,t) for each of the 163 standards from SFAS 1 through 
SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions), in order to allow a comparison to dissents made by FASB members.  Constituent 
positions less than 0.5 are coded a dissent, while positions equal to 0.5 are coded as one-half of a dissent. 
Constituent dissent % 
(ConstDissent%t) 
Continuous This variable measures constituent dissent percentage on standard t (total constituent dissents ÷ total matched votes), 
and is populated for 159 of the 163 standards from SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
FASB dissent 
percentage 
(FASB Dissentt) 
Continuous This variable is measured as the dissent percentage on FASB votes (total dissents ÷ total votes) for each of the 163 
standards from SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions).  This variable is calculated using the full population 
of FASB votes, not only those matched to sponsors’ positions. 
Increase relevance 
(Inc_Relvt) 
Binary This variable identifies standards that increase perceived accounting relevance.  It equals one if either of the two Allen 
and Ramanna (2013) relevance metrics (inc_relv and Manual_inc_relv) is greater than zero.  It is populated for 160 out 
of the 163 standards from SFASs 1 through 160 (inclusive of revisions) – all except SFAS 38, 103, and 141R. 
CF References 
(CF_Refst) 
Continuous This variable measures the frequency of authoritative references to the CF on standard t.  It is measured as the log of [1 
+ (the number of authoritative references to the CF)] and is populated for each of the 163 standards from SFAS 1 through 
SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions).  Refer to Appendix 3, where I provide all CF_Refst values. 
Average tenure 
(AvgTenuret) 
Continuous This variable identifies the average tenure of FASB members, and is measured as the log of the average number of 
standards the members have voted on as of (and inclusive of) standard t.  It is populated for each of the 163 standards 
from SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
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One-year lagged 
market returns 
(LagReturnt) 
Continuous This variable provides the lagged one-year market return as of the date of the final ED to each standard.  It is calculated 
from the daily Value-Weighted Return (including dividends) (Variable Name: VWRETD) from the CRSP Stock Market 
Indexes file, and is populated for each of the 163 SFASs from 1 through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
Number of recent 
FASB standards 
(ED_Frequencyt) 
Continuous This variable is measured as the log of the number of Exposure Drafts (that ultimately became standards) that were 
issued by the FASB in the two years prior to the date of the final ED to each standard.  It is populated for each of the 
163 standards from SFASs 1 through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
Standards issued in the 
Pre-CF regime 
(Pre-CFt) 
Binary This indicator variable identifies standards issued in the Pre-CF regime, and is equal to one for SFAS 1 through SFAS 
91.  When Pre-CF is included as a stand-alone independent variable in a regression, the reference category in the 
regression is CF, an excluded indicator variable equal to one for SFAS 91 through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
Standards issued 
under a supermajority 
vote (Supermajorityt) 
Binary This indicator variable is equal to one for the following standards which were issued under a required supermajority 
vote: SFAS 1 through SFAS 15 and SFAS 107 through SFAS 144, and is populated for each of the 163 SFASs from 1 
through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
Sponsoring 
organization position 
(POSm_Ordinal) 
Discrete This variable represents the position of sponsoring organization m on each comment letter.  Because it is used as a 
dependent variable, I monotonically transform POSm which took values {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0} such that the variable 
POSm_Ordinal takes integer values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.  These data are hand-coded and are collected from comment letters 
to the final ED for SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions).  I identify a total of 528 sponsoring organization 
positions across those 163 standards. Refer to Appendix 2, where I provide all POSm values. 
Pre-CF FASB member 
(FASB_Pre-CF) 
Binary This is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the signatories on a sponsor’s CL was later selected to the FASB 
in the Pre-CF regime.  These data are hand-collected from CLs to the final ED for SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive 
of revisions).  I identify a total of 22 such CLs. 
CF FASB member 
(FASB_CF) 
Binary This is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the signatories on a sponsor’s CL was later selected to the FASB 
in the CF regime.  These data are hand-collected from CLs to the final ED for SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of 
revisions).  I identify a total of 37 such CLs. 
Position of other 
sponsoring 
organizations 
(POSothers_Ordinal) 
Continuous This is the average of the ordinal comment letter positions taken by the other sponsors on the related standard.  These 
data are hand-collected from CLs to the final ED for SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions).  I drop all 
comment letters where the related standard has fewer than two matched sponsoring organization positions; as such, this 
will be the average position of one to four other organizations.  Because of this requirement, I lose eight observations 
(out of 528 sponsor positions) where only one sponsor submitted a CL on a standard. 
Length of time between 
issuance of the final 
ED and the standard 
(TimeLagt) 
Continuous This variable measures the length of time between the release of the final Exposure Draft related to standard t and the 
standard itself, and is calculated as the log of the number of months between release of the ED and the standard.  The 
number of months is a continuous variable calculated as [(Date of standard – Date of ED)/30].  This variable is populated 
for each of the 163 standards from SFASs 1 through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
Length of time between 
the agenda date and 
the standard issuance 
(OverallLagt) 
Continuous This variable measures the length of time between the date the project related to standard t was added to the agenda and 
the release of standard t, and is calculated as the log of the number of months between the agenda date and the release 
of the standard.  The number of months is a continuous variable calculated as [(Date of standard – Agenda Date)/30].  
This variable is populated for each of the 163 standards from SFASs 1 through 160 (inclusive of revisions). 
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APPENDIX 2.  Position of sponsoring organizations in comment letters, SFAS 1 – SFAS 160 
 
SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm 
1 AICPA 0.75 13 FEI 0.5 26 IMA 1 41 CFA Inst 0.25 
1 FEI 0.75 13 IMA 1 27 AICPA 0.5 42 AICPA 0.75 
1 IMA 1 13 CFA Inst 1 27 FEI 1 42 FEI 0 
1 CFA Inst 1 13 AAA 1 27 IMA 1 42 IMA 0.5 
2 AICPA 0.75 14 AICPA 0.75 28 AICPA 0.75 43 AICPA 0.75 
2 FEI 1 14 FEI 0.5 28 FEI 0.75 43 FEI 0.5 
2 IMA 0.75 14 IMA 0.75 28 IMA 1 43 IMA 0.5 
2 CFA Inst 1 14 CFA Inst 0.75 29 AICPA 0.25 44 AICPA 1 
2 AAA 0.75 14 AAA 1 29 FEI 0 44 IMA 0.75 
3 AICPA 0.75 15 AICPA 0.5 29 IMA 1 45 IMA 1 
3 FEI 1 15 FEI 1 30 AICPA 1 47 AICPA 0.5 
3 IMA 1 15 IMA 0.75 30 FEI 1 47 FEI 0 
3 CFA Inst 1 15 CFA Inst 0.5 31 AICPA 0.75 47 IMA 1 
3 AAA 1 16 AICPA 1 31 IMA 1 48 FEI 1 
4 AICPA 0.75 16 FEI 1 32 AICPA 0.75 48 IMA 1 
4 FEI 0 16 IMA 1 32 FEI 1 49 FEI 1 
4 IMA 1 16 CFA Inst 1 32 IMA 1 49 IMA 1 
4 CFA Inst 0.75 17 AICPA 0.5 33 AICPA 0.75 50 AICPA 1 
5 AICPA 0.75 17 IMA 1 33 FEI 0.5 50 IMA 1 
5 FEI 0.5 18 AICPA 1 33 IMA 0.75 50 AAA 1 
5 IMA 0.75 18 FEI 1 33 CFA Inst 0 51 AICPA 0.75 
5 CFA Inst 1 18 IMA 1 33 AAA 0.75 51 IMA 1 
5 AAA 1 18 CFA Inst 0 34 FEI 0.5 51 AAA 1 
6 AICPA 0.75 19 AICPA 0.5 34 IMA 0.25 52 AICPA 0.75 
6 FEI 1 19 CFA Inst 1 34 CFA Inst 0.25 52 FEI 0.5 
6 IMA 1 20 AICPA 0.5 35 AICPA 0.75 52 IMA 0.25 
6 CFA Inst 1 20 FEI 1 35 FEI 0.5 53 AICPA 0.25 
6 AAA 1 20 IMA 1 35 IMA 0.75 53 IMA 1 
7 AICPA 0.75 21 AICPA 1 35 CFA Inst 0.5 53 AAA 1 
7 FEI 1 21 FEI 1 36 AICPA 0.75 54 AICPA 1 
7 CFA Inst 1 21 IMA 1 36 FEI 0 54 FEI 0 
8 AICPA 0.75 21 CFA Inst 0.25 36 IMA 0 55 AICPA 1 
8 FEI 0.5 22 AICPA 0.75 36 CFA Inst 0.75 55 FEI 1 
8 IMA 0 22 FEI 1 37 AICPA 1 55 IMA 1 
8 CFA Inst 0.75 22 IMA 0.5 38 AICPA 0.75 56 FEI 1 
9 AICPA 0.75 23 AICPA 0.75 38 FEI 1 56 IMA 1 
9 FEI 1 23 FEI 1 38 IMA 1 57 AICPA 0.75 
9 CFA Inst 1 23 IMA 1 39 AICPA 0 57 FEI 1 
10 AICPA 1 24 AICPA 1 39 FEI 0.25 57 IMA 1 
11 AICPA 0.75 24 FEI 1 39 IMA 0 58 AICPA 0.25 
11 FEI 1 24 IMA 1 39 CFA Inst 0.25 58 FEI 0.75 
11 CFA Inst 0.75 25 AICPA 1 40 FEI 0.25 58 IMA 1 
12 AICPA 0.75 25 FEI 1 40 IMA 0 59 AICPA 1 
12 FEI 0.25 25 IMA 1 40 CFA Inst 0.25 59 IMA 1 
12 CFA Inst 0.75 25 CFA Inst 0 41 AICPA 0 59 AAA 1 
12 AAA 0.75 26 AICPA 1 41 FEI 0.25 60 AICPA 0.5 
13 AICPA 0.75 26 FEI 1 41 IMA 0 60 IMA 1 
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SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm 
61 AICPA 0.75 78 IMA 0 93 IMA 0.5 106 AAA 0.75 
61 IMA 1 79 AICPA 1 93 AAA 0.5 107 AICPA 0.75 
62 AICPA 0.75 79 IMA 1 94 AICPA 0.25 107 FEI 0.25 
62 FEI 0 80 AICPA 0.5 94 FEI 0.5 107 IMA 0.5 
62 IMA 1 80 FEI 0.75 94 IMA 0.5 107 CFA Inst 0.5 
62 AAA 0.25 80 IMA 1 94 CFA Inst 0.75 107 AAA 0.75 
63 AICPA 0.75 81 AICPA 0.25 94 AAA 0.75 108 FEI 1 
63 IMA 1 81 FEI 1 95 AICPA 0.75 108 IMA 1 
63 AAA 1 81 IMA 0.75 95 FEI 0.75 109 AICPA 0.75 
64 AICPA 1 81 CFA Inst 1 95 IMA 1 109 FEI 0.75 
64 FEI 0.75 82 AICPA 1 95 CFA Inst 0.75 109 IMA 0.75 
64 IMA 0.75 82 FEI 1 95 AAA 0.75 109 CFA Inst 0.75 
65 AICPA 0.75 82 IMA 1 96 AICPA 0.5 110 AICPA 1 
65 IMA 1 83 AICPA 1 96 FEI 0.25 110 FEI 1 
66 AICPA 0.75 83 FEI 1 96 IMA 0.5 110 IMA 1 
66 IMA 1 83 IMA 1 96 AAA 1 110 CFA Inst 0.5 
67 AICPA 0.75 84 AICPA 0.75 97 AICPA 0.5 111 AICPA 1 
67 IMA 1 84 FEI 0.75 98 AICPA 0.75 111 FEI 1 
68 AICPA 1 84 IMA 1 98 FEI 0.75 111 IMA 1 
68 FEI 0.75 85 AICPA 1 98 IMA 1 111 CFA Inst 1 
68 IMA 0 85 FEI 1 98 AAA 1 112 AICPA 0.75 
69 AICPA 0.75 85 IMA 1 99 AICPA 0.5 112 FEI 1 
69 FEI 0.5 86 AICPA 0.75 99 FEI 1 112 IMA 1 
69 IMA 0.25 86 FEI 1 99 IMA 1 112 CFA Inst 1 
70 AICPA 0.75 86 IMA 0.75 99 AAA 0 113 AICPA 0 
70 FEI 0.75 86 CFA Inst 0 100 AICPA 1 113 FEI 0.5 
70 IMA 1 87 AICPA 0.5 100 FEI 1 113 CFA Inst 1 
70 AAA 0.25 87 FEI 0 100 IMA 1 114 AICPA 0.75 
71 AICPA 0.75 87 IMA 0.25 100 CFA Inst 1 114 FEI 0.5 
71 IMA 1 87 CFA Inst 0.75 101 AICPA 0.25 114 IMA 0.5 
72 AICPA 0.75 87 AAA 0.75 101 IMA 0 114 CFA Inst 0.75 
72 FEI 0 88 AICPA 0.5 101 AAA 0.75 114 AAA 0.5 
72 IMA 0.75 88 FEI 0.75 102 AICPA 1 115 AICPA 0.75 
73 AICPA 1 88 IMA 0.75 102 FEI 0.75 115 FEI 0.25 
73 IMA 1 89 AICPA 1 102 IMA 1 115 IMA 0.75 
74 AICPA 0.75 89 FEI 1 103 FEI 1 115 CFA Inst 0.25 
74 FEI 0 89 IMA 1 103 IMA 1 115 AAA 0.5 
74 IMA 0.5 89 AAA 0.75 104 AICPA 1 116 AICPA 0.75 
75 IMA 1 90 AICPA 0.75 104 FEI 0.75 116 FEI 0.5 
76 AICPA 0.5 90 FEI 0.5 104 IMA 0.75 116 IMA 0.5 
76 FEI 0.75 90 IMA 1 104 CFA Inst 1 116 AAA 0.5 
76 IMA 1 91 AICPA 0.5 105 AICPA 0.75 117 AICPA 0.75 
77 AICPA 0 91 FEI 0.75 105 FEI 0.75 117 IMA 0 
77 FEI 1 91 IMA 0.75 105 IMA 0.75 117 AAA 0.25 
77 IMA 1 92 AICPA 0.75 105 CFA Inst 1 118 AICPA 1 
77 CFA Inst 0 92 FEI 0.5 106 AICPA 0.5 118 FEI 1 
77 AAA 0 92 IMA 0.75 106 FEI 0.25 118 IMA 1 
78 AICPA 0.75 93 AICPA 0.75 106 IMA 0.5 118 CFA Inst 0 
78 FEI 0 93 FEI 0.75 106 CFA Inst 1 118 AAA 0.25 
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SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm SFAS Sponsor POSm 
119 AICPA 0.75 129 IMA 1 141 AICPA 0.75 151 CFA Inst 0.75 
119 FEI 0.5 129 CFA Inst 1 141 FEI 0.25 153 AICPA 0.75 
119 IMA 0.75 130 AICPA 0.25 141 CFA Inst 0.75 153 FEI 0.75 
119 CFA Inst 0.75 130 FEI 0.25 141 AAA 0.5 153 IMA 0.5 
119 AAA 1 130 IMA 0 142 AICPA 0 153 CFA Inst 0.75 
120 AICPA 1 130 CFA Inst 0.75 142 FEI 0.25 123R AICPA 0.5 
120 FEI 0.75 130 AAA 1 142 IMA 0.5 123R FEI 0.5 
120 CFA Inst 1 131 AICPA 0.25 142 CFA Inst 0.5 123R IMA 0.25 
121 AICPA 0.75 131 FEI 0 142 AAA 0.5 123R CFA Inst 0.75 
121 FEI 0.75 131 IMA 1 143 AICPA 0.5 123R AAA 0.75 
121 IMA 1 131 CFA Inst 0.75 143 IMA 0.25 154 AICPA 0.75 
121 CFA Inst 0.75 132 AICPA 0.75 143 CFA Inst 0.75 154 FEI 0.25 
122 AICPA 0.75 132 IMA 0.25 144 AICPA 0.5 154 IMA 0.75 
122 FEI 0.5 132 CFA Inst 1 144 FEI 0.5 154 CFA Inst 0.75 
122 IMA 0.5 132 AAA 0.75 144 CFA Inst 0.75 154 AAA 0.75 
122 CFA Inst 0.75 133 AICPA 1 146 AICPA 0.25 155 AICPA 0.75 
122 AAA 0.75 133 FEI 0.5 146 FEI 0 156 AICPA 0.75 
123 FEI 0.5 133 IMA 0.25 146 CFA Inst 1 157 AICPA 0.75 
123 CFA Inst 0.75 133 CFA Inst 1 147 AICPA 0.25 157 FEI 0 
124 AICPA 1 134 AICPA 1 147 CFA Inst 0.75 157 IMA 0.25 
124 IMA 1 134 IMA 0.75 148 FEI 1 157 CFA Inst 0.75 
125 AICPA 0.5 135 AICPA 0.75 148 CFA Inst 0.5 157 AAA 0.75 
125 FEI 0.25 135 FEI 0.25 149 AICPA 0.75 158 AICPA 0.75 
125 IMA 0.5 136 AICPA 0.75 149 CFA Inst 0.5 158 FEI 0.5 
125 CFA Inst 0.75 136 AAA 0.75 150 AICPA 0 158 IMA 0.75 
125 AAA 0.75 137 AICPA 1 150 FEI 0 158 CFA Inst 1 
126 AICPA 1 137 FEI 1 150 IMA 0 158 AAA 1 
126 IMA 1 137 IMA 1 150 CFA Inst 1 159 AICPA 1 
127 AICPA 1 137 CFA Inst 1 150 AAA 0.5 159 IMA 1 
127 IMA 1 138 AICPA 1 132R AICPA 0.25 159 CFA Inst 0.5 
128 AICPA 1 138 FEI 1 132R FEI 0.25 159 AAA 0.25 
128 FEI 0.5 138 IMA 1 132R IMA 0.25 141R AICPA 0.25 
128 IMA 0.75 138 CFA Inst 1 132R CFA Inst 0 141R FEI 0 
128 CFA Inst 1 140 AICPA 0.75 151 AICPA 0.75 141R IMA 0 
129 AICPA 1 140 FEI 0.75 151 FEI 0.5 141R CFA Inst 0.75 
129 FEI 1 140 CFA Inst 0.75 151 IMA 0.25 160 AICPA 0.25 
 
Appendix 2 provides the position of sponsoring organization m on each comment letter for each of the 163 standards 
from SFAS 1 through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions), where available.  I classify sponsors’ comment letter 
positions into five categories: strongly oppose (POSm = 0), lean oppose (0.25), neither support nor oppose (0.5), lean 
support (0.75), and strongly support (POSm = 1).  Refer to the supplementary internet appendix for a description of 
the coding process.  
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APPENDIX 3.  Representativeness and CF_Refs for all standards, SFAS 1 – SFAS 160 
 
SFAS   Rt CF_Refst SFAS   Rt CF_Refst SFAS   Rt CF_Refst SFAS   Rt CF_Refst 
1 0.78 0 42 0.88 0 83 1.00 0 124 0.60 1.79 
2 0.77 0 43 0.94 0 84 0.78 0 125 0.64 1.95 
3 0.83 0 44 0.56 0 85 1.00 0 126 1.00 0 
4 0.90 0 45  0 86 0.83 0 127 1.00 0 
5 0.77 0 46  0 87 0.98 1.79 128 0.88 0.69 
6 1.00 0 47 0.75 0.69 88 0.81 0.69 129 1.00 0 
7 1.00 0 48  0 89 0.71 0 130 0.68 2.89 
8 0.85 0 49  0 90 0.65 1.10 131 0.58 1.39 
9 1.00 0 50 1.00 0 91 0.80 0.69 132 0.64 1.10 
10 1.00 0 51 0.85 0 92 0.90 0 133 0.75 2.08 
11 0.80 0 52 0.84 1.39 93 0.67 2.56 134 0.90 0 
12 0.83 0 53 0.55 0 94 0.58 2.20 135 0.55 0 
13 1.00 0 54 1.00 0 95 0.71 2.30 136 0.75 1.79 
14 0.78 0 55 0.75 0 96 0.71 1.79 137 0.67 0 
15 0.98 0 56  0 97 0.83 1.39 138 0.67 1.10 
16 0.80 0 57 0.81 1.79 98 0.67 0 139  0 
17 1.00 0 58 0.91 0 99 0.92 0 140 0.95 2.08 
18 1.00 0 59 1.00 0.69 100 1.00 0 141 0.54 3.37 
19 0.75 0 60 0.63 0 101 0.42 1.39 142 0.21 2.83 
20 0.60 0 61 0.81 0 102 0.85 0 143 0.40 3.33 
21 0.80 0 62 1.00 0 103 1.00 0 144 0.54 2.89 
22 0.95 0 63 0.95 0.69 104 0.90 0 145  0 
23 0.80 0 64 0.94 0 105 0.75 2.20 146 0.46 3.00 
24 0.60 0 65 0.81 0 106 0.50 2.56 147 0.38 0.69 
25 0.75 0.69 66 0.69 0 107 0.68 1.39 148 0.83 0 
26 1.00 0 67 0.94 0 108  0 149 0.69 1.61 
27 0.88 0 68 0.84 1.10 109 0.75 2.56 150 0.36 1.95 
28 0.78 0 69 0.84 0 110 1.00 0 132R 0.21 1.10 
29 0.31 0 70 0.88 0 111 1.00 0 151 0.63 0 
30 1.00 0 71 0.94 1.61 112 0.85 0 152  0 
31 0.81 0 72 0.66 1.10 113 0.20 1.10 153 0.71 0.69 
32 0.81 0 73 1.00 0 114 0.96 0.69 123R 0.54 2.30 
33 0.77 1.39 74 0.88 0.69 115 0.79 1.10 154 0.68 1.10 
34 0.69 0.69 75  0 116 0.79 2.89 155 0.75 0 
35 0.73 0.69 76 0.91 1.10 117 0.42 2.71 156 0.75 1.10 
36 0.80 0 77 0.50 1.61 118 0.96 0 157 0.57 3.00 
37 1.00 0 78 0.94 0 119 0.75 0.69 158 0.79 1.39 
38 0.69 0 79 1.00 0.69 120 0.92 0 159 0.89 0 
39 0.28 0.69 80 0.84 0 121 0.88 1.10 141R 0.45 2.71 
40 0.19 0 81 0.73 0 122 0.68 0.69 160 0.25 1.39 
41 0.28 0 82 1.00 0 123 0.92 1.95    
 
Appendix 3 provides the values of Representativeness and CF_Refs for each of the 163 standards from SFAS 1 
through SFAS 160 (inclusive of revisions), where available.  Standards are presented in chronological order.  
Representativeness measures the diversity of FASB positions on standard t relative to sponsors’ positions, while 
CF_Refs measures the frequency of each standard’s authoritative references to the conceptual framework. 
 
Additional detail regarding each variable is included within Appendix 1.
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FIGURE 1.  Relationship between the FASB, FAF, constituent sponsoring organizations, and standard setting constituent groupsa 
 
Constituent Groups 
 
Sponsoring 
Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between standard setting constituent groups, their sponsoring organizations, the FAF, and the FASB, as described in section 
2.1.  This structure has undergone revision through time; SIFMA was added in 1976, while the Government organizations were added in 1984 (Gore 1992, 142). 
  
                                                          
a Full names of the sponsoring organizations that are referred to in shorthand notation above are as follows: AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants), FEI (Financial Executives Institute), IMA (Institute of Management Accountants; formerly named NAA – National Association of Accountants), 
SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; formerly named SIA – Securities Industry Association), AAA (American Accounting 
Association), GFOA (Government Finance Officers Association), and NASACT (National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers).  The 
CFA Institute was formerly named AIMR (Association for Investment Management and Research), and is a successor organization to the Financial Analysts 
Federation.  The Government constituency is represented by a number of sponsors in addition to GFOA and NASACT; due to space considerations I do not 
reproduce the full list. 
FASB 
FAF 
Auditors 
 
AICPA 
Preparers 
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CFA Institute, 
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FIGURE 2.  Average number of times each standard cites the CF for authoritative guidance 
 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts time-series variation in the frequency of standards’ authoritative references to the conceptual 
framework.  Standards are presented in chronological order.  The names shown are the last names of the FASB 
Chairperson during each bracketed period: Marshall S. Armstrong, Donald J. Kirk, Dennis R. Beresford, Edmund L. 
Jenkins, and Robert H. Herz. 
 
The rolling averages are calculated over the prior nine standards.  The dotted line denotes authoritative references to 
APB Statement #4.  The dashed line denotes references that the Board was somehow limited because the conceptual 
framework was incomplete.  The solid line denotes authoritative references to the conceptual framework.  In some 
instances, this exceeds 8.0, which values are not visible on the graph.  The peak value of the rolling average is 12.9, 
relating to SFAS 146.  Note that these are the raw number of references, not the transformed (logged) values used in 
variable CF_Refs; see Appendix 1 for detail. 
 
The vertical line represents SFAS 91, which delineates the Pre-CF from the CF regime.   
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FIGURE 3.  Positions of FASB members and sponsoring organizations on a standard 
Figure 3 depicts the position of individual FASB member i (POSi) and sponsor m (POSm) on a standard.  I determine 
positions of FASB members by their vote on each standard (assent or dissent).  I operationalize the position of each 
constituent group as the average of the position taken by the group’s sponsor(s) in comment letters to the final 
Exposure Draft related to each standard.  I classify these positions into five categories (based upon whether the letter 
opposes or supports the related ED) per the descriptions provided above the scale.  The values provided above the 
scale indicate how each category was converted into a POSm value. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  Illustration of inside dissent and outside dissent 
 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates two types of dissent.  The horizontal line represents an ideological continuum, for example one’s 
preference for fair value accounting (with increasing preference for fair values moving rightward).  A simplifying 
assumption is made that standard-setters are uniformly distributed across the continuum.  In this example, a fair value 
standard is up for debate, indicated by the solid vertical line being positioned to the right of center.  This standard is 
opposed by a majority of standard-setters on the left of the continuum (outside dissent), but is supported by those 
standard-setters on the left whose positions are closest to the center (because the position of the standard is sufficiently 
near to their preferred position).  The standard is also supported by a majority of standard-setters on the right; however, 
it is opposed by the segment of standard-setters farthest to the right because the position of the standard is sufficiently 
far from their preferred position (inside dissent).  Inside dissent for a particular preference (e.g., fair value accounting) 
can only be observed on a standard favoring that preference. 
 
The key intuition of this depiction is that observing a dissenting vote does not distinguish a standard-setter whose 
position is in the shaded area on the left from one whose position is in the shaded area on the right. 
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FIGURE 5.  FASB dissent, constituent dissent, and standard type for matched sample 
 
 
 
Figure 5 depicts time-series variation in FASB dissent, constituent dissent, and standards that increase accounting 
relevance.  Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  The rolling averages are calculated over the prior nine 
standards.  The solid line represents FASB dissent percentage for the matched sample.  The dashed line represents 
constituent dissent percentage for the matched sample.  The dotted line represents the indicator variable Inc_Relv, 
which identifies standards increasing accounting relevance.  In some instances, this exceeds 70%, which values are 
not visible on the graph.  The peak value of the rolling average is 89%, relating to the both SFAS 148 and SFAS 149. 
 
The vertical line represents SFAS 91, which delineates the Pre-CF from the CF regime. 
SFAS 
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TABLE 1.  Descriptive statistics for standard-level variables 
 
 Panel A. Summary statistics for full sample 
Variable Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum 25% 75% Maximum 
Representativeness 153 0.766 0.800 0.201 0.188 0.667 0.917 1.000 
FASB Dissent 163 0.138 0.143 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.429 
POSj_Auditor 148 0.708 0.750 0.261 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
POSj_Preparer 149 0.701 0.875 0.325 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
POSj_User 78 0.702 0.750 0.312 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
POSj_Academic 46 0.707 0.750 0.285 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
AvgTenure 163 2.917 2.890 0.676 0.000 2.497 3.434 3.989 
LagReturn 163 0.123 0.135 0.177 –0.344 –0.008 0.252 0.651 
ED_Frequency 163 2.541 2.485 0.585 0.000 2.197 3.045 3.584 
CF_Refs 163 0.651 0.000 0.933 0.000 0.000 1.099 3.367 
Inc_Relv 160 0.306 0.000 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
 Panel B. Summary statistics for the Pre-CF and CF regimes 
 Pre-CF regime  CF regime  
Variable Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Difference in 
Means 
Representativeness 85 0.817 0.833 0.176  68 0.703 0.708 0.213 –0.114 *** 
FASB Dissent 91 0.169 0.143 0.163  72 0.098 0.000 0.129 –0.071 *** 
POSj_Auditor 83 0.729 0.750 0.241  65 0.681 0.750 0.285 –0.048  
POSj_Preparer 87 0.773 1.000 0.309  62 0.601 0.625 0.323 –0.172 *** 
POSj_User 30 0.617 0.750 0.387  48 0.755 0.750 0.245 0.139 * 
POSj_Academic 18 0.792 1.000 0.312  28 0.652 0.750 0.258 –0.140  
AvgTenure 91 3.083 3.296 0.831  72 2.706 2.799 0.296 –0.377 *** 
LagReturn 91 0.099 0.067 0.198  72 0.152 0.174 0.142 0.052 * 
ED_Frequency 91 2.817 2.890 0.631  72 2.192 2.197 0.231 –0.625 *** 
CF_Refs 91 0.237 0.000 0.476  72 1.174 1.099 1.095 0.937 *** 
Inc_Relv 90 0.089 0.000 0.286  70 0.586 1.000 0.496 0.497 *** 
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 Panel C. Summary statistics for Inc_Relv and non-Inc_Relv standards 
 Inc_Relv = 0  Inc_Relv = 1  
Variable Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Difference in 
Means 
Representativeness 102 0.822 0.833 0.156  48 0.651 0.708 0.234 –0.171 *** 
FASB Dissent 111 0.144 0.143 0.156  49 0.123 0.000 0.149 –0.020  
POSj_Auditor 101 0.745 0.750 0.237  45 0.633 0.750 0.295 –0.112 ** 
POSj_Preparer 104 0.775 1.000 0.304  42 0.521 0.500 0.292 –0.254 *** 
POSj_User 39 0.744 0.750 0.346  38 0.658 0.750 0.275 –0.086  
POSj_Academic 27 0.722 0.750 0.328  19 0.684 0.750 0.218 –0.038  
AvgTenure 111 2.970 2.914 0.766  49 2.808 2.858 0.417 –0.162 * 
LagReturn 111 0.102 0.097 0.184  49 0.165 0.173 0.157 0.064 ** 
ED_Frequency 111 2.635 2.565 0.631  49 2.337 2.303 0.410 –0.298 *** 
CF_Refs 111 0.375 0.000 0.711  49 1.262 1.099 1.055 –0.887 *** 
 
 
 Panel D. Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 Rt 
FASB 
Dissent 
POSj 
Audit 
POSj 
Preparer 
POSj 
User 
POSj 
Academic 
Avg 
Tenure 
Lag 
Return 
ED_ 
Freq 
CF_ 
Refs 
Inc_ 
Relv 
Rt  0.06 0.68*** 0.51*** 0.20* 0.13 0.14* –0.04 0.15* –0.46*** –0.40*** 
FASB Dissent 0.42**  –0.10 –0.11 –0.31*** –0.33** 0.13* 0.01 0.23*** –0.05 –0.06 
POSj_Audit 0.64*** –0.02  0.43*** 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.03 –0.36*** –0.20** 
POSj_Preparer 0.49*** 0.12 0.48***  0.05 0.05 0.06 –0.02 0.04 –0.51*** –0.36*** 
POSj_User 0.09 –0.42** –0.01 –0.05  0.65*** –0.24** 0.05 –0.38*** 0.01 –0.14 
POSj_Academic 0.29 –0.34* 0.08 0.10 0.58***  –0.22 0.18 –0.10 –0.15 –0.07 
AvgTenure –0.08 0.53*** –0.30 –0.14 –0.52*** –0.30  0.21*** 0.78*** –0.02 –0.11 
LagReturn –0.23 0.08 –0.10 –0.46** –0.09 0.00 0.19  0.20** 0.19** 0.17** 
ED_Frequency 0.06 0.48*** –0.17 –0.09 –0.37** –0.04 0.47*** 0.40**  –0.15** –0.23*** 
CF_Refs –0.74*** –0.04 –0.64*** –0.63*** –0.18 –0.24 0.33* 0.45** 0.08  0.44*** 
Inc_Relv –0.38** –0.25 0.00 –0.24 –0.16 –0.24 0.31* 0.22 –0.21 0.45**  
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for key standard-level variables as well as POSj values for each constituency.  Panel A provides summary statistics for the 
full sample, while Panel B (Panel C) provides separate statistics for the Pre-CF and CF regimes (for Inc_Relv and non-Inc_Relv standards).  Panel D provides the 
correlations between each variable.  Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal. 
Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  Representativeness (Rt) measures the diversity of FASB positions on standard t relative to sponsors’ positions.  FASB 
Dissent is the dissent percentage of the FASB vote on each standard.  POSj represents the position of constituent group j on each standard.  AvgTenure measures 
the experience level of the FASB members voting on each standard.  LagReturn is the lagged one-year return on the CRSP value-weighted index as of the date of 
the final ED to each standard.  ED_Frequency is the log of the number of Exposure Drafts that ultimately became standards that were issued in the two years prior 
to the date of the final ED to each standard.  CF_Refs identifies the frequency of authoritative references to the framework on each standard.  Inc_Relv is an 
indicator variable which identifies standards that increase accounting relevance. 
Differences in Panels B and C are calculated using a Welch’s t-test for unpaired data with unequal variances. 
Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level 
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TABLE 2.  Summary data for matched sample in the Pre-CF and CF regimes 
 
Panel A. FASB dissents and constituent dissents – Difference-in-differences 
 
 Pre-CF Regime CF Regime  
Matched 
FASB 
Dissents 
71 / 390 
 
18.2% 
42 / 372 
 
11.3% 
–6.9%*** 
 
(–2.71) 
Constituent 
Dissents 
70 / 390 
 
17.9% 
106.5 / 372 
 
28.6% 
10.7%*** 
 
(3.89) 
% Difference 
 
(t-stat) 
–0.3% 
 
(–0.09) 
17.3%*** 
 
(5.94) 
–17.6%*** 
 
(–4.34) 
 
 
Panel B. Analysis of submission frequency by constituent group 
Constituent 
Group 
Pre-CF Regime 
Matched Votes 
Constituent Dissents 
CF Regime 
Matched Votes 
Constituent Dissents 
Difference (t-stat) 
Auditors 
271 / 295 (92%) 
41.0 / 271 (15%) 
192 / 213 (90%) 
46.0 / 192 (24%) 
–1.7% 
8.8%*** 
(–0.66) 
(2.63) 
Preparers 
90 / 94 (96%) 
18.5 / 90 (21%) 
121 / 141 (86%) 
49.0 / 121 (40%) 
–9.9%*** 
19.9%*** 
(–2.75) 
(3.45) 
Users 
11 / 63 (17%) 
7.5 / 11 (68%) 
31 / 43 (72%) 
4 / 31 (13%) 
54.6%*** 
–55.3%*** 
(6.48) 
(–3.72) 
Academics 
18 / 91 (20%) 
3.0 / 18 (17%) 
28 / 71 (39%) 
7.5 / 28 (27%) 
19.7%*** 
10.1% 
(2.73) 
(0.88) 
 
Table 2 expands on the data in Panel B of Table 1.  Panel A provides data on FASB and constituent (i.e., sponsor) 
dissents within a difference-in-differences design, and is used to test Hypothesis 1b.  Panel B provides detail on 
comment letter submission frequencies and dissent by constituent group in the Pre-CF and CF regimes. 
Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  In Panel A, Matched FASB Dissents reflects the total number of FASB 
member dissents matched to a constituent position.  Voting data are hand-collected from each standard.  Constituent 
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Dissents reflects the total number of sponsor dissents matched to FASB member votes.  The left-hand column (right-
hand column) represents constituent positions matched to votes in the Pre-CF regime (CF regime). 
In Panel B, Pre-CF and CF Matched Votes reflects the total number of matched constituent positions and the total 
number of FASB votes (inclusive of unmatched votes), respectively, for each constituent group.  These data allow for 
an analysis of the potential effect of unobserved constituent positions due to “missing” comment letters.  Constituent 
Dissents is repeated from Panel A; in Panel B the data are disaggregated by constituent group. 
Vertical (horizontal) differences in Panel A are calculated by using a two-sample paired data mean-comparison test 
(Welch’s t-test for unpaired data with unequal variances).  The difference-in-differences is calculated as the difference 
in vertical differences using a Welch’s t-test for unpaired data with unequal variances.  Differences in Panel B are 
calculated using a Welch’s t-test for unpaired data with unequal variances. 
Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level
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TABLE 3.  Effect of standard characteristics on FASB Dissent in Pre-CF and CF regimes 
 
DV =  
FASB Dissent 
(1) (2) (3) (4)† (5)† (6)† 
Pre-CF 0.12*** 
(2.77) 
0.09** 
(1.97) 
0.05 
(0.84) 
0.18*** 
(2.82) 
0.15** 
(2.16) 
0.05 
(0.81)        
Inc_Relv   –0.04 
(–0.67) 
  –0.18** 
(–2.15)        
Inc_Relv*Pre-CF   0.21** 
(2.22) 
  0.27** 
(2.59)        
AvgTenure  0.05* 
(1.68) 
0.05 
(1.48) 
 0.05 
(1.44) 
0.05 
(1.37)        
Supermajority  –0.04 
(–0.76) 
–0.04 
(–0.58) 
 –0.05 
(–0.53) 
–0.04 
(–0.39)        
Constant –0.02 
(–0.43) 
–0.13 
(–1.12) 
–0.10 
(–0.78) 
–0.10 
(–1.37) 
–0.21 
(–1.32) 
–0.12 
(–0.81)               
Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] 
[F-test] 
  0.16*** 
[7.55] 
  0.09** 
[4.81]               
Observations 163 163 160 163 163 160        
Pseudo R2 6.0% 9.0% 11.4% 10.0% 12.5% 16.6% 
 
Table 3 provides results for the estimation of equation 2, and is used for testing Hypotheses 1a and 2a.  Columns (1) 
and (4) estimate a basic version of the equation without any control variables; columns (2) and (5) include control 
variables; and columns (3) and (6) estimate the full equation.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) use FASB Dissent, the dissent 
percentage of the FASB vote on each standard (total dissents ÷ total votes).  †Columns (4), (5), and (6) are run using 
an adjusted FASB Dissent metric that converts ‘inside’ dissents on fair value standards to assents.  I use a Tobit 
regression because the dependent variable FASB Dissent is left-censored at zero. 
Pre-CF is an indicator variable equal to one for SFAS 1 through SFAS 91.  The variable Inc_Relv is an indicator 
variable which identifies standards that increase accounting relevance.  The reference category is CF, an indicator 
variable (excluded from these regressions) equal to one for SFAS 92 through SFAS 160, so the coefficients on the 
standalone Inc_Relv variable reflects the CF regime.  Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] represents the sum of the two Inc_Relv 
coefficients, and reflects the impact in the Pre-CF regime.  Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
T-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by 
combination.  Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level  
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TABLE 4.  Effect of standard characteristics on Representativeness in Pre-CF and CF regimes 
 
DV =  
Representativeness 
(1) (2) (3) (4)† (5)† (6)† 
Pre-CF 0.11** 
(2.87) 
0.13** 
(2.58) 
0.09* 
(1.88) 
0.13*** 
(3.04) 
0.14** 
(2.70) 
0.09* 
(1.84)        
Inc_Relv   –0.10** 
(–2.67) 
  –0.12*** 
(–2.92)        
Inc_Relv*Pre-CF   –0.19* 
(–1.86) 
  –0.19 
(–1.66)        
AvgTenure  0.05 
(1.59) 
0.05 
(1.71) 
 0.05 
(1.42) 
0.05 
(1.55)        
LagReturn  0.03 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.50) 
 0.03 
(0.43) 
0.05 
(0.58)        
ED_Frequency  –0.05 
(–1.57) 
–0.04 
(–1.20) 
 –0.05 
(–1.41) 
–0.04 
(–1.09)        
Constant 0.70*** 
(21.58) 
0.67*** 
(10.61) 
0.70*** 
(11.30) 
0.69*** 
(20.04) 
0.66*** 
(10.39) 
0.71*** 
(11.21)               
Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] 
[F-test] 
  –0.28*** 
[9.60] 
  –0.31*** 
[9.13]               
Observations 153 153 150 153 153 150        
Adjusted R2 7.4% 6.8% 17.0% 8.8% 8.1% 21.1% 
 
Table 4 provides results for the estimation of equation 3, and is used for testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b.  Columns (1) 
and (4) estimate a basic version of the equation without any control variables; columns (2) and (5) include control 
variables; and columns (3) and (6) estimate the full equation.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) use Representativeness, which 
measures the diversity of FASB positions on standard t relative to sponsors’ positions.  †Columns (4), (5), and (6) are 
run using an adjusted Rt metric that converts ‘inside’ dissents on fair value standards to assents. 
Pre-CF is an indicator variable equal to one for SFAS 1 through SFAS 91.  The variable Inc_Relv is an indicator 
variable which identifies standards that increase accounting relevance.  The reference category is CF, an indicator 
variable (excluded from these regressions) equal to one for SFAS 92 through SFAS 160, so the coefficients on the 
standalone Inc_Relv variable reflects the CF regime.  Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] represents the sum of the two Inc_Relv 
coefficients, and reflects the impact in the Pre-CF regime.  Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
T-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by 
combination.  Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level 
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TABLE 5.  Effect of standard characteristics on constituent dissent in Pre-CF and CF regimes 
 
DV =  
ConstDissent% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-CF –0.18* 
(–1.91) 
–0.11 
(–1.07) 
0.10 
(0.89) 
0.03 
(0.31)      
Inc_Relv  
 
0.19 
(1.56) 
 0.05 
(0.35)      
Inc_Relv*Pre-CF  
 
0.48*** 
(2.70) 
 0.62*** 
(3.55)      
CF_Refs  
 
 0.25*** 
(6.87) 
0.22*** 
(5.48)      
CF_Refs*Pre-CF  
 
 –0.01 
(–0.11) 
0.02 
(0.16)      
Constant 0.12 
(1.60) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
–0.20** 
(–2.35) 
–0.19** 
(–2.08)           
Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] 
[F-test] 
 0.67*** 
[28.85] 
 0.67*** 
[47.05]      
CF_Refs[Pre-CF] 
[F-test] 
  0.24** 
[4.99] 
0.24** 
[4.09]           
Observations 159 156 159 156      
Pseudo R2 1.7% 7.8% 11.4% 16.6% 
 
Table 5 provides results for the estimation of equation 4, and is a supplementary test of Hypothesis 2b.  Column (1) 
estimates a basic version of the equation; column (2) [column (3)] includes Inc_Relv [CF_Refs] variables; and column 
(4) estimates the full equation.  I use a Tobit regression because the dependent variable ConstDissent%, which 
measures constituent dissent percentage on standard t, is left-censored at zero. 
Pre-CF is an indicator variable equal to one for SFAS 1 through SFAS 91.  Inc_Relv is an indicator variable which 
identifies standards that increase accounting relevance, while CF_Refs identifies the frequency of authoritative 
references to the CF.  The reference category is CF, an indicator variable (excluded from these regressions) equal to 
one for SFAS 92 through SFAS 160, so the coefficients on the standalone Inc_Relv and CF_Refs variables reflects the 
CF regime.  Inc_Relv[Pre-CF] (CF_Refs[Pre-CF]) represents the sum of the two Inc_Relv (CF_Refs) coefficients, 
and reflects the impact in the Pre-CF regime.  Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
T-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by 
combination.  Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level 
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TABLE 6.  Detail on dissenting argument types on fair value standards 
 
Panel A. Inside dissent on fair value standards in the Pre-CF and CF regimes 
   Difference in CF regime 
  
Pre-CF 
 
CF 
 
Difference 
Approx. 
d.f. 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Total fair value standards 7 32     
Total votes 49 218     
Total dissents 16 18     
Dissent % 32.7% 8.3%     
Total # inside dissents 3 11     
% of dissent from inside 18.8% 61.1% 42.3%** 33.62 2.73 0.010 
Dissent % (excl. inside dissent) 26.5% 3.2%     
 
 
Panel B. List of fair value standards in CF regime with inside dissent 
SFAS Title 
Total 
Votes 
Total 
Dissents < FV > FV 
114 Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan 7 2 0 2 
115 Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities 7 2 0 2 
125 Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities 
7 1 0 1 
140 Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities 
6 1 0 1 
146 Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities 7 1 0 1 
155 Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments 7 1 0 1 
156 Accounting for Servicing of Financial Assets 7 1 0 1 
159 The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 7 2 0 2 
 
Panel A of Table 6 provides results for inside dissent on fair value standards in the Pre-CF and CF regimes, and is 
used for testing Hypothesis 3.  Panel B documents the standards on which I observe inside dissent in the CF regime.  
I define a fair value standard as those with a Manual_inc_relv value greater than zero.  Manual_inc_relv is an Allen 
and Ramanna (2013) metric that identifies standards that utilize fair value accounting. 
In Panel A, column 2 (column 3) provides data for the Pre-CF regime (CF regime).  Total votes and Total dissents 
are hand-collected from each standard.  When a FASB member abstains, it is not included as a vote within the “Total 
votes” above.  The first percentage is Total dissents as a percentage of Total votes. 
In Panel A, “Total # inside dissents” represents the number of dissenting arguments explicitly calling for greater use 
of fair values, which for analytical purposes is limited to one argument per dissenter.  For brevity, I omit data on all 
other dissenting arguments.  The second percentage is the total number of inside dissenting arguments as a percentage 
of total dissents.  The third (and final) percentage is the total number of dissents excluding those with inside dissenting 
arguments as a percentage of total votes.  The difference (column 4) is calculated using a Welch’s t-test for unpaired 
data with unequal variances.  Column 5 provides the approximate degrees of freedom in the calculation of the 
difference, determined using the Welch formula. 
Panel B provides the standards on which I observe inside dissent in the CF regime.  Dissenting arguments that 
explicitly call for lesser (greater) use of fair values are included in column 5 (6), and are limited to one fair value 
argument per dissenter. 
Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level 
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TABLE 7.  Analysis of comment letter signatories and standard type 
 
DV = POSm_Ordinal 
(1) 
Full Sample 
 (2) 
Inc_Relv = 1 
 (3) 
CF_Refs > 0 
 Mean 
(z-stat) 
% Change 
in Odds 
 Mean 
(z-stat) 
% Change 
in Odds 
 Mean 
(z-stat) 
% Change 
in Odds 
FASB_Pre-CF –0.44** 
(–2.00) 
–36%       
FASB_CF 0.39 
(1.01) 
48%  1.37* 
(1.83) 
292%  0.62 
(1.40) 
86% 
POSothers_Ordinal 0.78*** 
(5.36) 
119%  1.00*** 
(4.09) 
172%  0.74*** 
(4.74) 
109% 
                  
FASB_CF – 
FASB_Pre-CF 
[Chi-square test] 
0.83** 
[6.14] 
n/a 
      
                  
Fixed effects? Yes; Sponsor 
(overall FE and 
Inc_Relv-specific) 
 Yes; Sponsor  Yes; Sponsor 
(overall FE and 
Inc_Relv-specific) 
Observations 511  170  237 
Pseudo R2 8.1%  9.5%  7.0% 
 
Table 7 provides results for the estimation of equation 6.  Each observation reflects a comment letter sent by one of 
the following five sponsors: AICPA, FEI, IMA, CFA Institute, and AAA.  I drop all comment letters where the related 
standard has fewer than two matched sponsor positions.  I use an ordered logit regression because the dependent 
variable consists of five ordered categories.  Column (1) includes the full sample of all remaining comment letters; 
column (2) includes only CLs on standards increasing accounting relevance; and column (3) includes only CLs on 
standards authoritatively referencing the CF.  For brevity, I omit the estimated coefficients relating to both overall 
sponsor and Inc_Relv-specific fixed effects, as well as the estimated constants (i.e. the “cut-points”).  The final value 
within each column provides the percentage change in odds for an increase in POSm_Ordinal for a unit increase in the 
independent variable. 
Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  POSm_Ordinal represents the position of sponsor m on each comment 
letter.  FASB_Pre-CF [FASB_CF] is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the signatories on the comment 
letter was later selected to the FASB in the Pre-CF [CF] regime.  There are 22 [37] such letters in column (1); 1 [16] 
such letters in column (2); and 1 [25] such letters in column (3).  I omit FASB_Pre-CF in columns (2) and (3) because 
there is only one related comment letter on which to estimate each coefficient.  Results from a Chi-square test of the 
difference in the estimated coefficients on FASB_Pre-CF and FASB_CF are included in column (1). 
Z-statistics are in brackets underneath each coefficient.  Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by 
sponsor.  Significance levels based on two-tailed p-values: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level 
